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In this paper, we build a new test of rational expectations based on the
marginal distributions of realizations and subjective beliefs. This test is widely
applicable, including in the common situation where realizations and beliefs
are observed in two different datasets that cannot be matched. We show that
whether one can rationalize rational expectations is equivalent to the distribu-
tion of realizations being a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of beliefs.
The null hypothesis can then be rewritten as a system of many moment inequal-
ity and equality constraints, for which tests have been recently developed in the
literature. The test is robust to measurement errors under some restrictions
and can be extended to account for aggregate shocks. Finally, we apply our
methodology to test for rational expectations about future earnings. While
individuals tend to be right on average about their future earnings, our test
strongly rejects rational expectations.
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1 Introduction
How individuals form their beliefs about uncertain future outcomes is critical to
understanding decision making. Despite longstanding critiques (see, among many
others, Pesaran, 1987; Manski, 2004), rational expectations remain by far the most
popular framework to describe belief formation (Muth, 1961). This theory states that
agents have expectations that do not systematically differ from the realized outcomes,
and efficiently process all private information to form these expectations. Rational
expectations (RE) are a key building block in many macro- and micro-economic
models, and in particular in most of the dynamic microeconomic models that have
been estimated over the last two decades (see, e.g., Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2010;
Blundell, 2017, for recent surveys).
In this paper, we build a new test of RE. Our test only requires having access to
the marginal distributions of subjective beliefs and realizations, and, as such, can
be applied quite broadly. In particular, this test can be used in a data combination
context, where individual realizations and subjective beliefs are observed in two dif-
ferent datasets that cannot be matched. Such situations are common in practice (see,
e.g., Delavande, 2008; Arcidiacono, Hotz and Kang, 2012; Arcidiacono, Hotz, Maurel
and Romano, 2014; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2014a; Kuchler and Zafar, 2019;
Kapor, Neilson and Zimmerman, 2020). Besides, even in surveys for which an explicit
aim is to measure subjective expectations, such as the Michigan Survey of Consumers
or the Survey of Consumer Expectations of the New York Fed, expectations and re-
alizations can typically only be matched for a subset of the respondents. And of
course, regardless of attrition, whenever one seeks to measure long or medium-term
outcomes, matching beliefs with realizations does require waiting for a long period of
time before the data can be made available to researchers.
The tests of RE implemented so far in this context only use specific implications of the
RE hypothesis. In contrast, we develop a test that exploits all possible implications
of RE. Using the key insight that we can rationalize RE if and only if the distribution
of realizations is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of beliefs, we show that
rationalizing RE is equivalent to satisfying one moment equality and (infinitely) many
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moment inequalities.1 As a consequence, if these moment conditions hold, RE cannot
be rejected, given the data at our disposal. By exhausting all relevant implications
of RE, our test is able to detect much more violations of rational expectations than
existing tests.
To develop a statistical test of RE rationalization, we build on the recent literature on
inference based on moment inequalities, and more specifically, on Andrews and Shi
(2017). By applying their results to our context, we show that our test controls size
asymptotically and is consistent over fixed alternatives. We also provide conditions
under which the test is not conservative.
We then consider several extensions to our baseline test. First, we show that by using
a set of covariates that are common to both datasets, we can increase our ability to
detect violations of RE. Another important issue is that of unanticipated aggregate
shocks. Even if individuals have rational expectations, the mean of observed outcomes
may differ from the mean of individual beliefs simply because of aggregate shocks.
We show that our test can be easily adapted to account for such shocks.
Finally, we prove that our test is robust to measurement errors in the following
sense. If individuals have rational expectations but both beliefs and outcomes are
measured with (classical) errors, then our test does not reject RE provided that the
amount of measurement errors on beliefs does not exceed the amount of intervening
transitory shocks plus the measurement errors on the realized outcomes. In particular,
this allows for elicited beliefs to be noisier than realized outcomes. This provides a
rationale for our test even in cases where realizations and beliefs are observed in the
same dataset, since a direct test based on a regression of the outcome on the beliefs
(see, e.g., Lovell, 1986) is, at least at the population level, not robust to any amount
of measurement errors on the subjective beliefs.
We apply our framework to test for rational expectations about future earnings. To
do so, we combine elicited beliefs about future earnings with realized earnings, using
data from the Labor Market module of the Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE,
New York Fed), and test whether household heads form rational expectations on
1Interestingly, the equivalence on which we rely, which is based on Strassen’s theorem (Strassen,
1965), is also used in the microeconomic risk theory literature, see in particular Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970).
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their annual labor earnings. While a naive test of equality of means between earnings
beliefs and realizations shows that earnings expectations are realistic in the sense of
not being significantly biased, thus not rejecting the rational expectations hypothesis,
our test does reject rational expectations at the 1% level. Taken together, our find-
ings illustrate the practical importance of incorporating the additional restrictions
of rational expectations that are embedded in our test. The results of our test also
indicate that the RE hypothesis is more credible for certain subpopulations than oth-
ers. For instance, we reject RE for individuals without a college degree, who exhibit
substantial deviations from RE. On the other hand, we fail to reject the hypothesis
that college-educated workers have rational expectations on their future earnings.
By developing a test of rational expectations in a setting where realizations and sub-
jective beliefs are observed in two different datasets, we bring together the literature
on data combination (see, e.g., Cross and Manski, 2002, Molinari and Peski, 2006,
Fan, Sherman and Shum, 2014, Buchinsky, Li and Liao, 2019, and Ridder and Moffitt,
2007 for a survey), and the literature on testing for rational expectations in a micro
environment (see, e.g., Lovell, 1986; Gourieroux and Pradel, 1986; Ivaldi, 1992, for
seminal contributions).
On the empirical side, we contribute to a rapidly growing literature on the use of
subjective expectations data in economics (see, e.g., Manski, 2004; Delavande, 2008;
Van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008; Van der Klaauw, 2012; Arcidiacono, Hotz, Maurel
and Romano, 2014; de Paula, Shapira and Todd, 2014; Stinebrickner and Stinebrick-
ner, 2014b; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015). In this paper, we show how to incorporate all
of the relevant information from subjective beliefs combined with realized data to test
for rational expectations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the main
theoretical equivalences underlying our RE test, and the corresponding statistical
tests. Section 3 illustrates the finite sample properties of our tests through Monte
Carlo simulations. Section 4 applies our framework to expectations about future
earnings. Finally, Section 5 concludes. The appendix collects various theoretical
extensions, additional simulation results, additional material on the application, and
all the proofs. The companion R package RationalExp, described in the user guide
(D’Haultfœuille, Gaillac and Maurel, 2018a), performs the test of RE.
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2 Testing rational expectations
2.1 Set-up
We assume that the researcher has access to a first dataset containing the individual
outcome variable of interest, which we denote by Y . She also observes, through a
second dataset drawn from the same population, the elicited individual expectation
on Y , denoted by ψ. The two datasets, however, cannot be matched. We focus on
situations where the researcher has access to elicited beliefs about mean outcomes,
as opposed to probabilistic expectations about the full distribution of outcomes. The
type of subjective expectations data we consider in the paper has been collected in
various contexts, and used in a number of prior studies (see, among others, Delavande,
2008; Zafar, 2011b; Arcidiacono, Hotz and Kang, 2012; Arcidiacono, Hotz, Maurel and
Romano, 2014; Hoffman and Burks, 2020).
Formally, ψ = E [Y |I], where I denotes the σ-algebra corresponding to the agent’s
information set and E [·|I] is the subjective expectation operator (i.e. for any U ,
E [U |I] is a I-measurable random variable). We are interested in testing the rational
expectations (RE) hypothesis ψ = E[Y |I], where E [·|I] is the conditional expecta-
tion operator generated by the true data generating process. Importantly, we remain
agnostic throughout most of our analysis on the information set I. Our setting is also
compatible with heterogeneity in the information different agents use to form their
expectations. To see this, let (U1, ..., Um) denote m variables that agents may or may
not observe when they form their expectations, and let Dk = 1 if Uk is observed, 0
otherwise. Then, if I is the information set generated by (D1U1, ..., DmUm), agents
will use different subsets of the (Uk)k=1...m (i.e., different pieces of information) de-
pending on the values of the (Dk)k=1...m. By remaining agnostic on the information
set, our analysis complements several studies which primarily focus on testing for dif-
ferent information sets, while maintaining the rational expectations assumption (see
Cunha and Heckman, 2007, for a survey).
It is easy to see that the RE hypothesis imposes restrictions on the joint distribution of
realizations Y and beliefs ψ. In this data combination context, the relevant question
of interest is then whether one can rationalize RE, in the sense that there exists a
triplet (Y ′, ψ′, I ′) such that (i) the pair of random variables (Y ′, ψ′) are compatible
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with the marginal distributions of Y and ψ; and (ii) ψ′ correspond to the rational
expectations of Y ′, given the information set I ′, i.e., E(Y ′|I ′) = ψ′. Hence, we
consider the test of the following hypothesis:
H0 : there exists a pair of random variables (Y
′, ψ′) and a sigma-algebra I ′ such that
σ(ψ′) ⊂ I ′, Y ′ ∼ Y, ψ′ ∼ ψ and E [Y ′|I ′] = ψ′,
where ∼ denotes equality in distribution. Rationalizing RE does not mean that
the true realizations Y , beliefs ψ and information set I are such that E [Y |I] = ψ.
Instead, it means that there exists a triplet (Y ′, ψ′, I ′) consistent with the data and
such that E [Y ′|I ′] = ψ′. In other words, rejecting H0 implies that RE does not hold,
in the sense that the true realizations, beliefs, and information set do not satisfy RE
(E [Y |I] 6= ψ). The converse, however, is not true.
2.2 Equivalences
2.2.1 Main equivalence
Let δ = E [Y ]− E [ψ], Fψ and FY denote the cumulative distribution functions (cdf)
of ψ and Y , x+ = max(0, x), and define
∆(y) =
∫ y
−∞
FY (t)− Fψ(t)dt.
Throughout most of our analysis, we impose the following regularity conditions on
the distributions of realized outcomes (Y ) and subjective beliefs (ψ):
Assumption 1 E (|Y |) <∞ and E (|ψ|) <∞.
The following preliminary result will be useful subsequently.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then H0 holds if and only if there exists
a pair of random variables (Y ′, ψ′) such that Y ′ ∼ Y , ψ′ ∼ ψ and E [Y ′|ψ′] = ψ′.
Lemma 1 states that in order to test for H0, we can focus on the constraints on
the joint distribution of Y and ψ, and ignore those related to the information set.
This is intuitive given that we impose no restrictions on this set. Our main result
is Theorem 1 below. It states that rationalizing RE (i.e., H0) is equivalent to a
continuum of moment inequalities, and one moment equality.
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Theorem 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. The following statements are equiva-
lent:
(i) H0 holds;
(ii) (FY is a mean-preserving spread of Fψ) ∆(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ R and δ = 0;
(iii) E
[
(y − Y )+ − (y − ψ)+] ≥ 0 for all y ∈ R and δ = 0.
The implication (i) ⇒ (iii) and the equivalence between (ii) and (iii) are simple to
establish. The key part of the result is to prove that (iii) implies (i). To show this,
we first use Lemma 1, which states that H0 is equivalent to the existence of (Y
′, ψ′)
such that Y ′ ∼ Y , ψ′ ∼ ψ and E [Y ′|ψ′] = ψ′. Then the result essentially follows from
Strassen’s theorem (Strassen, 1965, Theorem 8).
It is interesting to note that Theorem 1 is related to the theory of risk in microeco-
nomic theory. In particular, using the terminology of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970),
(ii) states that realizations (Y ) are more risky than beliefs (ψ). The main value of
Theorem 1, from a statistical point of view, is to transform H0 into the set of moment
inequality (and equality) restrictions given by (iii). We show in Section 2.3 how to
build a statistical test of these conditions.
Comparison with alternative approaches We now compare our approach with
alternative ones that have been proposed in the literature. In the following discussion,
as in this whole section, we reason at the population level and thus ignore statistical
uncertainty. Accordingly, the “tests” we consider here are formally deterministic, and
we compare them in terms of data generating processes violating the null hypothesis
associated with each of them.
Our approach can clearly detect many more violations of rational expectations than
the “naive” approach based solely on the equality E(Y ) = E(ψ). It also detects more
violations than the approach based on the restrictions E(Y ) = E(ψ) and V(Y ) ≥
V(ψ) (approach based on the variance), which has been considered in particular in
the macroeconomic literature on the accuracy and rationality of forecasts (see, e.g.
Patton and Timmermann, 2012). On the other hand, and as expected since it relies
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on the joint distribution of (Y, ψ), the “direct” approach for testing RE, based on
E(Y |ψ) = ψ, can detect more violations of rational expectations than ours.
To better understand the differences between these four different approaches (“naive”,
variance, “direct”, and ours), it is helpful to consider important particular cases. Of
course, if ψ = E [Y |I], individuals are rational and none of the four approaches
leads to reject RE. Next, consider departures from rational expectations of the form
ψ = E [Y |I] + η, with η independent of E [Y |I]. If E(η) 6= 0, subjective beliefs are
biased, and individuals are on average either over-pessimistic or over-optimistic. It
follows that E(Y ) 6= E(ψ), implying that all four approaches lead to reject RE.
More interestingly, if E(η) = 0, individuals’ expectations are right on average, and
the naive approach does not lead to reject RE. However, it is easy to show that,
as long as deviations from RE are heterogeneous in the population (V(η) > 0), the
direct approach always leads to a rejection. In this setting, our approach constitutes
a middle ground, in which rejection of RE depends on the degree of dispersion of
the deviations from RE (η) relative to the uncertainty shocks (ε = Y − E(Y |I)). In
other words and intuitively, we reject RE whenever departures from RE dominate the
uncertainty shocks affecting the outcome. Formally, and using similar arguments as in
Proposition 4 in Subsection 2.2.4, one can show that if ε is independent of E [Y |I], we
reject H0 as long as the distribution of the uncertainty shocks stochastically dominates
at the second-order the distribution of the deviations from RE.
Specifically, if ε ∼ N (0, σ2ε) and η ∼ N (0, σ2η), we reject RE if and only if σ2η > σ2ε .
In such a case, our approach boils down to the variance approach mentioned above:
we reject whenever V(ψ) > V(Y ). But interestingly, if the discrepancy (η) between
beliefs and RE is not normally distributed, we can reject H0 even if V(ψ) ≤ V(Y ).
Suppose for instance that ε ∼ N (0, 1) and
η = a (−1{U ≤ 0.1}+ 1{U ≥ 0.9}) , U ∼ U [0, 1] and a > 0.
In other words, 80% of individuals are rational, 10% are over-pessimistic and form ex-
pectations equal to E [Y |I]−a, whereas 10% are over-optimistic and expect E [Y |I]+a.
Then one can show that our approach leads to reject RE when a ≥ 1.755, while for
a = 1.755, V(η) ' 0.616 < V(ε) = 1.
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Binary outcome Our equivalence result does not require the outcome Y to be
continuously distributed. In the particular case where Y is binary, our test re-
duces to the naive test of E(Y ) = E(ψ). Indeed, when Y is a binary outcome
and ψ ∈ [0, 1], one can easily show that as long as E(Y ) = E(ψ), the inequalities
E
[
(y − Y )+ − (y − ψ)+] ≥ 0 automatically hold for all y ∈ R. This applies to expec-
tations about binary events, such as, e.g., being employed or not at a given date.
Interpretation of the boundary condition To shed further light on our test and
on the interpretation of H0, it is instructive to derive the distributions of Y |ψ that
correspond to the boundary condition (∆(y) = 0). The proposition below shows that,
in the presence of rational expectations, agents whose beliefs ψ lies at the boundary
of H0 have perfect foresight, i.e. ψ = E[Y |I] = Y .2
Proposition 1 Suppose that (Y, ψ) satisfies RE, u 7→ F−1Y |ψ(τ |u) is continuous for
all τ ∈ (0, 1), and ∆(y0) = 0 for some y0 in the interior of the support of ψ. Then
Y |ψ = y0 is degenerate.
2.2.2 Equivalence with covariates
In practice we may observe additional variables X ∈ RdX in both datasets. Assuming
that X is in the agent’s information set, we modify H0 as follows:
3
H0X : there exists a pair of random variables (Y
′, ψ′) and a sigma-algebra I ′ such that
σ(ψ′, X) ⊂ I ′, Y ′|X ∼ Y |X, ψ′|X ∼ ψ|X and E [Y ′|I ′] = ψ′.
Adding covariates increases the number of restrictions that are implied by the rational
expectation hypothesis, thus improving our ability to detect violations of rational
expectations. Proposition 2 below formalizes this idea and shows that H0X can be
expressed as a continuum of conditional moment inequalities, and one conditional
moment equality.
2For any cdf F , we let F−1 denote its quantile function, namely F−1(τ) = inf{x : F (x) ≥ τ}.
3See complementary work by Gutknecht et al. (2018), who use subjective expectations data to
relax the rational expectations assumption, and propose a method allowing to test whether specific
covariates are included in the agents’ information sets.
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Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. The following two statements are
equivalent:
(i) H0X holds;
(ii) Almost surely, E
[
(y − Y )+ − (y − ψ)+∣∣X] ≥ 0 for all y ∈ R and E [Y − ψ|X] =
0.
Moreover, if H0X holds, H0 holds as well.
2.2.3 Equivalence with unpredictable aggregate shocks
Oftentimes, the outcome variable is affected not only by individual-specific shocks,
but also by aggregate shocks. We denote by C the random variable corresponding to
the aggregate shocks. The issue, in this case, is that we observe a single realization
of C (c, say), along with the outcome variable conditional on that realization C =
c. In other words, we only identify FY |C=c rather than FY , as the latter would
require to integrate over the distribution of all possible aggregate shocks. Moreover,
the restriction E [Y |C = c, ψ] = ψ is generally violated, even though the rational
expectations hypothesis holds. It follows that one cannot directly apply our previous
results by simply replacing FY by FY |C=c. In such a case, one has to make additional
assumptions on how the aggregate shocks affect the outcome.
To illustrate our approach, let us consider the example of individual income. Suppose
that the logarithm of income of individual i at period t, denoted by Yit, satisfies a
Restricted Income Profile model:
Yit = αi + βt + εit,
where βt capture aggregate (macroeconomic) shocks, εit follows a zero-mean ran-
dom walk, and αi, (βt)t and (εit)t are assumed to be mutually independent. Let
Iit−1 denote individual i’s information set at time t − 1, and suppose that Iit−1 =
σ (αi, (βt−k)k≥1, (εit−k)k≥1). If individuals form rational expectations on their future
outcomes, their beliefs in period t − 1 about their future log-income in period t are
given by
ψit = E [Yit|Iit−1] = αi + E [βt|(βt−k)k≥1] + εit−1.
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Thus, Yit = ψit + Ct + εit − εit−1, with Ct = βt − E [βt|(βt−k)k≥1]. The corresponding
conditional expectation is given by:
E [Yit|Iit−1, Ct = ct] = ψit + ct 6= ψit.
To get closer to our initial set-up, we now drop indexes i and t and maintain the
conditioning on the aggregate shocks C = c implicit. Under these conventions, ra-
tionalizing RE does not correspond to E [Y |I] = ψ, but instead to E [Y |I] = c0 + ψ
for some c0 ∈ R. A similar reasoning applies to multiplicative instead of additive
aggregate shocks. In such a case, the null takes the form E [Y |I] = c0ψ, for some
c0 > 0. In these two examples, c0 is identifiable: by c0 = E(Y )−E(ψ) in the additive
case, by c0 = E(Y )/E(ψ) in the multiplicative case. Moreover, there exists in both
cases a known function q(y, c) such that E(q(Y, c0)) = E(ψ), namely q(y, c) = y − c
and q(y, c) = y/c for additive and multiplicative shocks, respectively.
More generally, we consider the following null hypothesis for testing RE in the pres-
ence of aggregate shocks:
H0S : there exist random variables (Y
′, ψ′) , a sigma-algebra I ′ and c0 ∈ R such that
σ(ψ′) ⊂ I ′, Y ′ ∼ Y, ψ′ ∼ ψ and E [q (Y ′, c0)|I ′] = ψ′.
where q(., .) is a known function supposed to satisfy the following restrictions.
Assumption 2 E (|ψ|) <∞ and for all c, E (|q (Y, c) |) <∞. Moreover, E [q(Y, c)] =
E[ψ] admits a unique solution, c0.
By applying our main equivalence result (Theorem 1) to q(Y, c0) and ψ, we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then the following statements are
equivalent:
(i) H0S holds;
(ii) E
[
(y − q (Y, c0))+ − (y − ψ)+
] ≥ 0 for all y ∈ R.
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A few remarks on this proposition are in order. First, this result can be extended
in a straightforward way to a setting with covariates. This is important not only
to increase the ability of our test to detect violations of RE, but also because this
allows for aggregate shocks that differ across observable groups. We discuss further
this extension, and the corresponding statistical test, in Appendix A.1. Second, in
the presence of aggregate shocks, the null hypothesis does not involve a moment
equality restriction anymore; the corresponding moment is used instead to identify
c0. Related, a clear limitation of the naive test (E(Y ) = E(ψ)) is that, unlike our test,
it is not robust to aggregate shocks. In this case, rejecting the null could either stem
from violations of the rational expectation hypothesis, or simply from the presence
of aggregate shocks. Third, in Appendix A.2, we examine whether one can extend
the results above to test for RE when aggregate shocks affect the outcomes in a
more general way. Proposition 6 establishes a negative result in this respect: as
long as one allows for a sufficiently flexible dependence between the outcome and
the aggregate shocks, any given distribution of subjective expectations is arbitrarily
close to a distribution for which RE can be rationalized. This implies that, within
this more general class of outcome models, there does not exist any almost-surely
continuous RE test that has non-trivial power.
2.2.4 Robustness to measurement errors
We have assumed so far that Y and ψ were perfectly observed; yet measurement
errors in survey data are pervasive (see, e.g. Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz, 2001).
We explore in the following the extent to which our test is robust to measurement
errors. By robust, we mean that the test does not incorrectly reject RE, when they
in fact hold. Specifically, assume that the true variables (ψ and Y ) are unobserved.
Instead, we only observe ψ̂ and Ŷ , which are affected by classical measurement errors.4
4See Zafar (2011a) who does not find evidence of non-classical measurement errors on subjective
beliefs elicited from a sample of Northwestern undergraduate students. We conjecture that our test
is robust to some forms of non-classical measurement errors. However, it seems difficult in this case
to obtain a general result similar to the one in Proposition 4.
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Namely:
ψ̂ = ψ + ξψ with ξψ ⊥ ψ, E[ξψ] = 0
Ŷ = Y + ξY with ξY ⊥ Y, E[ξY ] = 0.
(1)
The following proposition shows that our test is robust to a certain degree of mea-
surement errors on the beliefs. As above, we let ε = Y − ψ denote the uncertainty
shocks.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Y and ψ satisfy H0 and let
(
ψ̂, Ŷ
)
be defined as in (1).
Suppose also that ε+ ξY ⊥ ψ and Fξψ dominates at the second order FξY +ε. Then Ŷ
and ψ̂ satisfy H0.
The key condition is that Fξψ dominates at the second order FξY +ε, or, equivalently
here, that FξY +ε is a mean-preserving spread of Fξψ . Recall that in the case of normal
variables, ξψ ∼ N (0, σ21) and ξY + ε ∼ N (0, σ22), this is in turn equivalent to imposing
σ21 ≤ σ22. Thus, even if there is no measurement error on Y , so that ξY = 0, this
condition may hold provided that the variance of measurement errors on ψ is smaller
than the variance of the uncertainty shocks on Y . More generally, this allows elicited
beliefs to be - potentially much - noisier than realized outcomes, a setting which is
likely to be relevant in practice.
In situations where (Ŷ , ψ̂) are jointly observed, one could in principle alternatively
implement the direct test. However, in contrast to our test, the direct test is not robust
to any measurement errors on the subjective beliefs ψ. Indeed, if RE holds, so that
E [Y |ψ] = ψ, it is nevertheless the case that E
[
Ŷ
∣∣∣ψ̂] 6= ψ̂, as long as Cov(ξY , ψ̂) =
Cov(ξψ, Y ) = 0 and V(ξψ) > 0. In other words, even if individuals have rational
expectations, the direct test will reject the null hypothesis in the presence of even an
arbitrarily small degree of measurement errors on the elicited beliefs.
Also, it is unclear whether, in the presence of measurement errors on the elicited beliefs
and beyond the restrictions on the marginal distributions, there are restrictions on
the copula of (Ŷ , ψ̂) that are implied by RE. For instance, we show in Proposition 7
in Appendix B that under RE, and without imposing restrictions on the dependence
between ξY + ε and ξψ, the coefficient of the (theoretical) linear regression of Ŷ on ψ̂
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remains unrestricted.5 On the other hand, if one assumes that Cov(ξY + ε, ξψ) ≥ 0
and V(ψ)/V(ξψ) ≥ λ for some λ ≥ 0, Proposition 7 also shows that the coefficient of
the linear regression of Ŷ on ψ̂ is bounded from below under RE. Such a restriction,
which does require to take a stand on the signal-to-noise ratio V(ψ)/V(ξψ), can be
easily added to the moment inequalities of our test if (Ŷ , ψ̂) is observed.
2.2.5 Other extensions
We now briefly discuss other relevant directions in which Theorem 1 can be extended.
First, another potential source of uncertainty on ψ is rounding. Rounding practices
by interviewees are common in the case of subjective beliefs. Under additional restric-
tions, it is possible in such a case to construct bounds on the true beliefs ψ (see, e.g.,
Manski and Molinari, 2010). We show in Appendix C that our test can be generalized
to accommodate this rounding practice.
Second, we have implicitly maintained the assumption so far that subjective beliefs
and realized outcomes are drawn from the same population. In Appendix D, we
relax this assumption and show that our test can be easily extended to allow for
sample selection under unconfoundedness, through an appropriate reweighting of the
observations.
Third, our equivalence result and our test can be extended to accommodate situations
with multiple outcomes (Yk)k=1,..,K and multiple subjective beliefs (ψk)k=1,..,K associ-
ated with each of these outcomes. Specifically, whether one can rationalize rational
expectations in this environment can be written as:
E(Yk|ψ1, ..., ψK) = ψk, for all k ∈ {1, ..., K}
which, in turn, is equivalent to the distribution of the outcomes Yk being a mean-
preserving spread of the distribution of the beliefs ψk. This situation arises in various
contexts, including cases where respondents declare their subjective probabilities of
making particular choices among K + 1 possible alternatives. This also arises in
situations where expectations about the distribution of a continuous outcome Y are
elicited through questions of the form “what do you think is the percent chance
5There might of course possibly be additional relevant information in the higher-order moments,
although we have not been able to find any.
14
that [Y] will be greater than [y]?”, for different values (yk)k=1,..,K . In such cases, it
is natural to build a RE test based on the multiple outcomes (1{Y > yk})k=1,..,K
and subjective beliefs (ψk)k=1,..,K , where ψk is the subjective survival function of Y
evaluated at yk.
2.3 Statistical tests
We now propose a testing procedure for H0X , which can be easily adapted to the case
where no covariate common to both datasets is available to the analyst. To simplify
notation, we use a potential outcome framework to describe our data combination
problem. Specifically, instead of observing (Y, ψ), we suppose to observe only, in
addition to the covariates X, Y˜ = DY +(1−D)ψ and D, where D = 1 (resp. D = 0)
if the unit belongs to the dataset of Y (resp. ψ). As in Subsection 2.1, we assume that
the two samples are drawn from the same population, which amounts to supposing
that D ⊥ (X, Y, ψ) (see Assumption 3-(i) below). In order to build our test, we use
the characterization (ii) of Proposition 2:
E
[
(y − Y )+ − (y − ψ)+∣∣X] ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ R and E [Y − ψ|X] = 0.
Equivalently but written more compactly with Y˜ only,
E
[
W
(
y − Y˜
)+∣∣∣∣X] ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ R and E [WY˜ ∣∣∣X] = 0,
whereW = D/E(D)−(1−D)/E(1−D). This formulation of the null hypothesis allows
us to apply the instrumental functions approach of Andrews and Shi (2017, AS), who
consider the issue of testing many conditional moment inequalities and equalities. We
then build on their results to establish that our test controls size asymptotically and
is consistent over fixed alternatives.6 The initial step is to transform the conditional
moments into the following unconditional moments conditions:
E
[
W
(
y − Y˜
)+
g(X)
]
≥ 0, E [(Y − ψ) g(X)] = 0.
for all y ∈ R and g belonging to a suitable class of non-negative functions.
6Other testing procedures could be used to implement our test, such as that proposed by Linton
et al. (2010).
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We suppose to observe a sample (Di, Xi, Y˜i)i=1...n of n i.i.d. copies of (D,X, Y˜ ).
We consider instrumental functions g that are indicators of belonging to specific
hypercubes within [0, 1]dX , hence we tranform the variables Xi to lie in [0, 1]
dX . For
notational convenience, we let X˜i denote the nontransformed vector of covariates, and
redefine Xi as:
Xi = Φ0
(
Σ̂
−1/2
X˜,n
(
X˜i − X˜ i
))
,
where, for any x = (x1, . . . , xdX ), we let Φ0(x) = (Φ(x1), . . . ,Φ (xdX ))
>. Here Φ
denotes the standard normal cdf, Σ̂X˜,n is the sample covariance matrix of
(
X˜i
)
i=1...n
and X˜n its sample mean.
Specifically, we consider instrumental functions g belonging to the class of functions
Gr = {ga,r, a ∈ Ar}, with Ar = {1, 2, . . . , 2r}dX (r ≥ 1), ga,r(x) = 1l {x ∈ Ca,r} and,
for any a = (a1, ..., adX )
> ∈ Ar,
Ca,r =
dX∏
u=1
(
au − 1
2r
,
au
2r
]
.
Finally, to define the test statistic T , we need to introduce additional notations. First,
let wi = nDi/
∑n
j=1Dj − n(1−Di)/
∑n
j=1(1−Dj) and define, for any y ∈ R,
m
(
Di, Y˜i, Xi, g, y
)
=
 m1 (Di, Y˜i, Xi, g, y)
m2
(
Di, Y˜i, Xi, g, y
)  =
 wi (y − Y˜i)+ g (Xi)
wiY˜ig (Xi)
 . (2)
Let mn(g, y) =
∑n
i=1m
(
Di, Y˜i, Xi, g, y
)
/n and define similarly mn,j for j = 1, 2. For
any function g and any y ∈ R, we also define, for some  > 0,
Σn(g, y) = Σ̂n(g, y) + Diag
(
V̂
(
Y˜
)
, V̂
(
Y˜
))
,
where Σ̂n(g, y) is the sample covariance matrix of
√
nmn (g, y) and V̂
(
Y˜
)
is the
empirical variance of Y˜ . We then denote by Σn,jj(g, y) (j = 1, 2) the j-th diagonal
term of Σn(g, y).
Then the (Crame´r-von-Mises) test statistic T is defined by
T =sup
y∈Ŷ
rn∑
r=1
(2r)−dX
(r2 + 100)
∑
a∈Ar
[
(1− p)
(
−
√
nmn,1 (ga,r, y)
Σn,11(ga,r, y)1/2
)+2
+ p
(√
nmn,2 (ga,r, y)
Σn,22(ga,r, y)1/2
)2 ]
,
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where Ŷ =
[
min
i=1,...,n
Y˜i, max
i=1,...,n
Y˜i
]
, p ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter weighting the moments in-
equalities versus equalities and (rn)n∈N is a deterministic sequence tending to infinity.
To test for rational expectations in the absence of covariates, we set the instrumental
function equal to the constant function g(X) = 1, and the test statistic is simply
written as:
T = sup
y∈Ŷ
[
(1− p)
(
−
√
nmn,1(y)
Σn,11(y)1/2
)+2
+ p
(√
nmn,2(y)
Σn,22(y)1/2
)2 ]
,
where, using the notations introduced above, mn,j(y) = mn,j(1, y) and Σn,jj(y) =
Σn,jj(1, y) (j = 1, 2).
Whether or not covariates are included, the resulting test is of the form ϕn,α =
1l
{
T > c∗n,α
}
where the estimated critical value c∗n,α is obtained by bootstrap using as
in AS the Generalized Moment Selection method. Specifically, we follow three steps:
1. Compute the function ϕn (y, g) =
(
ϕn,1 (y, g) , 0
)>
for (y, g) in Ŷ ×∪rnr=1Gr, with
ϕn,1 (y, g) = Σ
1/2
n,11Bn1l
{
n1/2
κn
Σ
−1/2
n,11 mn,1(y, g) > 1
}
,
and where Bn = (b0 ln(n)/ ln(ln(n)))
1/2, b0 > 0, κn = (κ ln(n))
1/2, and κ > 0.
To compute Σn,11, we fix  to 0.05, as in AS.
2. Let
(
D∗i , Y˜
∗
i , X
∗
i
)
i=1,...,n
denote a bootstrap sample, i.e., an i.i.d. sample from
the empirical cdf of
(
D, Y˜ ,X
)
, and compute from this sample the bootstrap
counterparts of mn and Σn, m
∗
n and Σ
∗
n. Then compute the bootstrap coun-
terpart of T , T ∗, replacing Σn (y, ga,r) and
√
nmn (y, ga,r) by Σ
∗
n (y, ga,r) and√
n (m∗n −mn) (y, ga,r) + ϕn (y, ga,r), respectively.
3. The threshold c∗n,α is the quantile (conditional on the data) of order 1− α + η
of T ∗ + η for some η > 0. Following AS, we set η to 10−6.
Note that, despite the multiple steps involved, the testing procedure remains com-
putationally easily tractable. In particular, for the baseline sample we use in our
application (see Section 4.1), the RE test only takes 2 minutes.7
7This CPU time is obtained using our companion R package, on an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2643,
3.30GHz with 256Gb of RAM.
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We now turn to the asymptotic properties of the test. For that purpose, it is conve-
nient to introduce additional notations. Let Y and X denote the support of Y and
X respectively, and
LF =
{
(y, ga,r) : y ∈ Y , (a, r) ∈ Ar × N : EF
[
W
(
y − Y˜
)+
ga,r(X)
]
= 0
}
,
where, to make the dependence on the underlying probability measure explicit, EF
denotes the expectation with respect to the distribution F of
(
D, Y˜ ,X
)
. Finally, let
F denote a subset of all possible cumulative distribution functions of
(
D, Y˜ ,X
)
and
F0 be the subset of F such that H0X holds. We impose the following conditions on
F and F0.
Assumption 3
(i) For all F ∈ F , D ⊥ (X, Y, ψ);
(ii) There exists M > 0 such that Y˜ ∈ [−M,M ] for all F ∈ F . Also, infF∈F VF
(
Y˜
)
>
0 and 0 < infF∈F EF [D] ≤ supF∈F EF [D] < 1;
(iii) For all F ∈ F0, KF , the asymptotic covariance kernel of n−1/2Diag
(
VF
(
Y˜
))−1/2
mn
is in a compact set K2 of the set of all 2 × 2 matrix valued covariance kernels
on Y × ∪r≥1Gr with uniform metric d defined by
d(K,K ′) = sup
(y,g,y′,g′)∈(Y×∪r≥1Hr)
2
‖K(y, g, y′, g′)−K ′(y, g, y′, g′)‖ .
The main result of this section is Theorem 2. It shows that, under Assumption 3, the
test ϕn,α controls the asymptotic size and is consistent over fixed alternatives.
Theorem 2 Suppose that rn →∞ and Assumption 3 holds. Then:
(i) lim supn→∞ supF∈F0 EF [ϕn,α] ≤ α;
(ii) If there exists F0 ∈ F0 such that LF0 is nonempty and there exists (j, y0, g0) in
{1, 2} × LF0 such that KF0,jj(y0, g0, y0, g0) > 0, then, for any α ∈ [0, 1/2),
lim
η→0
lim sup
n→∞
sup
F∈F0
EF [ϕn,α] = α.
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(iii) If F ∈ F\F0, then limn→∞ EF (ϕn,α) = 1.
Theorem 2 (i) is closely related to Theorem 5.1 and Lemma 2 in AS. It shows that
the test ϕn,α controls the asymptotic size, in the sense that the supremum over F0
of its level is asymptotically lower or equal to α. To prove this result, the key is to
establish that, under Assumption 3, the class of transformed unconditional moment
restrictions that characterize the null hypothesis satisfies a manageability condition
(see Pollard, 1990). Using arguments from Hsu (2016), we then exhibit cases of
equality in Theorem 2 (ii), showing that, under mild additional regularity conditions,
the test has asymptotically exact size (when letting η tend to zero). Finally, Theorem
2 (iii), which is based on Theorem 6.1 in AS, shows that the test is consistent over
fixed alternatives.
Extension to account for aggregate shocks This testing procedure can be easily
modified to accommodate unanticipated aggregate shocks. Specifically, using the
notation defined in Section 2.2.3, we consider the same test as above after replacing
Y˜ by Y˜ĉ = Dq(Y, ĉ) + (1 − D)ψ, where ĉ denotes a consistent estimator of c0. The
resulting test is given by ϕn,α,ĉ = 1l
{
T (ĉ) > c∗n,α
}
(where T (ĉ) is obtained by replacing
Y˜ by Y˜ĉ in the original test statistic). Such tests have the same properties as those
above under some mild regularity conditions on q(·, ·), which hold in particular for the
leading examples of additive and multiplicative shocks (q(y, c) = y − c and q(y, c) =
y/c). We refer the reader to Appendix A.1 for a detailed discussion of this extension.
3 Monte Carlo simulations
In the following we study the finite sample performances of the test without covariates
through Monte Carlo simulations. The finite sample performances of the version of
our test that accounts for covariates are reported and discussed in Appendix E.
We suppose that the outcome Y is given by
Y = ρψ + ε,
with ρ ∈ [0, 1], ψ ∼ N (0, 1) and
ε = ζ (−1l{U ≤ 0.1}+ 1l{U ≥ 0.9}) ,
19
where ζ, U and ψ are mutually independent, ζ ∼ N (2, 0.1) and U ∼ U [0, 1]. In this
setup, E(Y |ψ) = ρψ and expectations are rational if and only if ρ = 1. But since we
observe Y and ψ in two different datasets, there are values of ρ 6= 1 for which our test
cannot reject the null hypothesis. More precisely, we can show that as the sample
size n grows to infinity, we reject the null if and only if ρ ≤ ρ∗ ' 0.616. Besides,
given this data generating process, the naive test E(Y ) = E(ψ) always fails to reject
RE, while the RE test based on variances is only able to detect a subset of violations
of RE that correspond to ρ < 0.445.
Results reported in Figure 1 show the power curves of the test ϕα for five different
sample sizes (nY = nψ = n ∈ {400; 800; 1, 200; 1, 600; 3, 200}) as a function of the
parameter ρ, using 800 simulations for each value of ρ. We use 500 bootstrap sim-
ulations to compute the critical values of the test. The test statistic T involves the
three tuning parameters b0, κ, and p (see Section 2.3 for definitions). As described
p.643 in Andrews and Shi (2013), there exists in practice a large range of admissible
values for these parameters. Following Section 4.2 of Beare and Shi (2019), we set
them equal to the smallest (resp. highest) value such that the rejection rate under
the null is below the nominal size 0.05, and obtain b0 = 0.3, κ = 0.001, and p = 0.05.
Several remarks are in order. First, as expected, under the alternative (i.e. for
values of ρ ≤ ρ∗ = 0.616), rejection frequencies increase with the sample size n. In
particular, for the largest sample size n = 3, 200, our test always results in rejection
of the RE hypothesis for values of ρ as large as .45. Second, in this setting, our test
is conservative in the sense that rejection frequencies under the null are smaller than
α = 0.05, for all sample sizes. This should not necessarily come as a surprise since the
test proposed by AS has been shown to be conservative in alternative finite-sample
settings (see, e.g. Table 1 p.22 in AS for the case of first-order stochastic dominance
tests). However, for the version of our test that accounts for covariates and for the
data generating process considered in Appendix E, rejection frequencies under the
null are very close to the nominal level.
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Notes: The vertical line at ρ ' 0.616 corresponds to the theoretical limit for the rejection
of the null hypothesis using our test. The dotted horizontal line corresponds to the 5%
level.
Figure 1: Power curves.
4 Application to earnings expectations
4.1 Data
Using the tests developed in Section 2.3, we now investigate whether household heads
form rational expectations on their future earnings. We use for this purpose data from
the Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE), a monthly household survey that has
been conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York since 2012 (see Armantier,
Topa, Van der Klaauw and Zafar, 2017, for a detailed description of the survey,
and Kuchler and Zafar, 2019; Conlon, Philossoph, Wiswall and Zafar, 2018; Fuster,
Kaplan and Zafar, 2020 for recent articles using the SCE). The SCE is conducted
with the primary goal of eliciting consumer expectations about inflation, household
finance, labor market, as well as housing market. It is a rotating internet-based panel
of about 1,200 household heads, in which respondents participate for up to twelve
months.8 Each month, the panel consists of about 180 entrants, and 1,100 repeated
respondents. While entrants are overall fairly similar to the repeated respondents,
8Each survey takes on average about fifteen minutes to complete, and respondents are paid $15
per survey completed.
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they are slightly older and also have slightly lower incomes (see Table 1 in Armantier
et al., 2017).
Of particular interest for this paper is the supplementary module on labor market
expectations. This module is repeated every four months since March 2014. Since
March 2015, respondents are asked the following question about labor market earnings
expectations (ψ) over the next four months: “What do you believe your annual
earnings will be in four months?”. Implicit throughout the rest of our analysis is the
assumption that these elicited beliefs correspond to the mean of the subjective beliefs
distribution.9 In this module, respondents are also asked about current job outcomes,
including their current annual earnings (Y ), through the following question: “How
much do you make before taxes and other deductions at your [main/current] job, on
an annual basis?”.
Specifically, we use for our baseline test the elicited earnings expectations (ψ), which
are available for two cross-sectional samples of household heads who were working
either full-time or part-time at the time of the survey, and responded to the labor
market module in March 2015 and July 2015 respectively. We combine this data with
current earnings (Y ) declared in July 2015 and November 2015 by the respondents
who are working full-time or part-time at the time of the survey.10 This leaves us
with a final sample of 2,993 observations, which is composed of 1,565 earnings expec-
tation observations, and 1,428 realized earnings observations. 51% (1,536) of these
observations correspond to the sub-sample of respondents who are reinterviewed at
least once. We refer to Table 1 for additional details on our sample.
9This assumption, while often made in the subjective expectations literature, is a priori restric-
tive. In this application, for the vast majority of the sub-groups of the population, the mean of ψ
cannot be statistically distinguished from the one of Y (see Table 2 below). This provides empirical
support for this assumption.
10Throughout our analysis (with the exception of the number of observations reported in Table 2)
we use the monthly survey weights of the SCE in order to obtain an estimation sample that is
representative of the population of U.S. household heads. See Armantier et al. (2017) for more details
on the construction of these weights. We also Winsorize the top 5 percentile of the distributions of
realized earnings and earnings beliefs.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the SCE sample
Mean Std. dev.
Male 0.53 0.50
White 0.74 0.43
College degree 0.49 0.46
Low numeracy 0.33 0.47
Tenure ≤ 6 months 0.17 0.38
Age 45.8 13.0
ψ (Earnings beliefs) $50,592 $40,889
Y (Realized earnings) $52,354 $38,634
4.2 Are earnings expectations rational?
In Table 2 below, we report the results from the naive test of RE (E(Y ) = E(ψ)), and
our preferred test (“Full RE”), where we allow for multiplicative aggregate shocks.
We implement the tests both on the overall population and on separate subgroups.
The latter approach allows us not only to identify which groups fail to rationalize
RE, but also, and importantly, to account for the possibility that aggregate shocks
may in fact differ across subgroups.11
Several remarks are in order. First, using our test, we reject for the whole population,
at any standard level, the hypothesis that agents form rational expectations over their
future earnings. Second, we also reject RE (at the 5% level) when we apply our test
separately for whites (non-Hispanics) and minorities, as well as low vs. high numeracy
test scores.12
Third, the results from our test point to beliefs formation being heterogeneous across
schooling (college degree vs. no college degree) and tenure (more or less than 6
11In practice we Winsorize the distribution of realized earnings (Y ) and earnings beliefs (ψ) at
the 95% level. We show in Table 4 in Appendix F.1 that our results are robust to other levels of
Winsorization.
12Respondents’ numeracy is evaluated in the SCE through five questions involving computation
of sales, interests on savings, chance of winning lottery, of getting a disease and being affected by
a viral infection. Respondents are then partitioned into two categories: “High numeracy” (4 or 5
correct answers), and “low numeracy” (3 or fewer correct answers).
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months spent in current job) levels. In particular, we cannot rule out that the beliefs
about future earnings of individuals with more schooling experience correspond to
rational expectations with respect to some information set. Similarly, while we reject
RE at any standard level for the subgroup of workers who have accumulated less
than 6 months of experience in their current job, we can only marginally reject at
the 10% level RE for those who have been in their current job for a longer period
of time. As such, these findings complement some of the recent evidence from the
economics of education and labor economics literatures that individuals have more
accurate beliefs about their ability as they progress through their schooling and work
careers (see, e.g., Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012; Arcidiacono, Aucejo, Maurel
and Ransom, 2016).
Table 2: Tests of RE on annual earnings
E(Y − ψ)/E(Y ) Naive RE Variance RE Full RE Number of obs.
(p-val) (p-val) (p-val) ψ Y
All 0.034 0.23 0.71 < 0.001 1,565 1,428
Women 0.059 0.13 0.62 < 0.001 730 649
Men 0.025 0.48 0.58 0.210 835 779
White 0.032 0.31 0.67 0.021 1,200 1,097
Minorities 0.046 0.43 0.60 < 0.006 365 331
College degree -0.001 0.96 0.50 0.130 1,106 1,053
No college degree 0.093 0.04 0.57 0.013 459 375
High numeracy 0.033 0.28 0.62 0.012 1,158 1,070
Low numeracy 0.055 0.27 0.58 0.022 407 358
Tenure ≤ 6 months 0.105 0.24 0.63 < 0.001 271 180
Tenure > 6 months 0.007 0.81 0.65 0.091 1,294 1,248
Notes: “Naive RE” denotes the naive RE test of equality of means between Y and ψ.
“Variance RE” denotes the variance RE test where the null hypothesis is the variance of Y
being greater or equal than the variance of ψ, once we account for aggregate, multiplicative
shocks. “Full RE” denotes the test without covariates, where we test H0S with q(y, c) =
y/c. We use 5,000 bootstrap simulations to compute the critical values of the Full RE
test. Distributions of realized earnings (Y ) and earnings beliefs (ψ) are both Winsorized
at the 95% quantile.
Fourth, using the naive test of equality of means between earnings beliefs and realiza-
24
tions, one would instead generally not reject the null at any standard levels. The one
exception is the subgroup of workers without a college degree, for whom the naive
test yields rejection of RE at the 5% level. But, as discussed before, one cannot rule
out that such a rejection is due to aggregate shocks.
Even though individuals in the overall sample form expectations over their earnings
in the near future that are realistic, in the sense of not being significantly biased, the
result from our preferred test shows that earnings expectations are nonetheless not
rational. Taken together, these findings highlight the importance of incorporating
the additional restrictions of rational expectations that are embedded in our test,
using the distributions of subjective beliefs and realized outcomes to detect violations
of rational expectations. That the variance test of RE never rejects the null at
any standard levels indicates that it is important in practice to go beyond the first
moments, and exploit instead the full distributions of beliefs and outcomes to detect
departures from rational expectations.
The results of the direct test of RE on the subsample of individuals who are followed
over four months are reported in Table 3 below. While these results generally paint a
similar picture to the results of our test, there are some differences. In particular, the
direct test rejects RE at the 5% level for men and at 1% for individuals with tenure
greater than 6 months, whereas we do not reject RE for the former group and only
marginally so, at the 10% level, for the latter. The direct test also rejects with less
power than our test for certain groups (low numeracy, tenure lower than 6 months,
and minorities). This lower power may seem surprising given that the direct test can
exploit the joint distribution of (Y, ψ), but is simply due to the important reduction
in sample size when focusing on the subsample of individuals who are followed over
four months results.
It is important to note that there are important issues associated with the direct
test, which generally warrant caution when interpreting the results from this test.
Most importantly, as already discussed in Section 2.2.4, the direct test is not robust
to measurement errors on the subjective beliefs ψ. As shown in Proposition 7 in
Appendix B, it is however possible to derive a restriction on β under RE. Specifically,
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if ξψ is positively correlated with ε+ ξY , we have, under RE,
β ≥ 1− 1
1 + λ
, (3)
where λ is a lower bound on the signal-to-noise ratio V(ψ)/V(ξψ). Table 3 also reports
the results of tests combining (3) with the restrictions on the marginal distributions
used in our full RE test. Adding the restriction (3) does not change the results
for values of signal-to-noise ratio between 5 and 20 (i.e., for noise-to-signal ratios
between 5% and 20%). Overall, using the subsample of linked data (Y, ψ) through
this additional restriction does not add much to our test, at least once we account for
possible measurement errors on the elicited beliefs. Another significant concern with
the direct test, and, more generally, the use of linked data on (Y, ψ), is that attrition
may be endogenous. We discuss this issue in more details in Appendix F.2.
Table 3: Direct test, our test, and combined test of RE on annual earnings
β Direct test Full RE Combined test Number of obs.
Bound on signal/noise λ 5 20
Implied bound on β 0.833 0.952
(p-val) (p-val) (p-value) (p-value) ψ Y (ψ, Y )
All 0.954 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 1,565 1,428 768
Women 0.956 0.002 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 730 649 356
Men 0.960 0.021 0.210 0.276 0.276 835 779 412
White 0.963 0.004 0.021 0.019 0.010 1,200 1,097 596
Minorities 0.928 0.010 0.006 0.007 0.005 365 331 172
College degree 0.974 0.060 0.130 0.182 0.182 1,106 1,053 560
No college degree 0.954 0.044 0.013 0.017 0.017 459 375 208
High numeracy 0.959 0.001 0.012 0.016 0.016 1,158 1,070 573
Low numeracy 0.954 0.094 0.022 0.030 0.030 407 358 195
Tenure ≤ 6 months 0.942 0.015 0.001 0.002 0.001 271 180 98
Tenure > 6 months 0.956 0.001 0.091 0.094 0.094 1,294 1,248 670
Notes: “Direct test” denotes the direct test of RE when (ψ, Y ) is observed. β is the coefficient of the
regression of Y on ψ in that case. “Full RE” denotes the test without covariates, where we test H0S
with q(y, c) = y/c. We use 5,000 bootstrap simulations to compute the critical values of the Full RE
test. “Combined RE test” denotes the test without covariates, where we test H0S with q(y, c) = y/c,
which is the “Full RE” test, combined with the additional restriction β ≥ 1− 1/(1 + λ), where λ is an
a priori bound on the signal-to-noise ratio. Distributions of realized earnings (Y ) and earnings beliefs
(ψ) are both Winsorized at the 95% quantile.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a new test of rational expectations that can be used in
a broad range of empirical settings. In particular, our test only requires having
access to the marginal distributions of realizations and subjective beliefs. As such,
it can be applied in frequent cases where realizations and beliefs are observed in
two separate datasets, or only observed for a selected sub-population. By bypassing
the need to link beliefs to future realizations, our approach also enables to test for
rational expectations without having to wait until the outcomes of interest are realized
and made available to researchers. We establish that whether one can rationalize
rational expectations is equivalent to the distribution of realizations being a mean-
preserving spread of the distribution of beliefs, a condition which can be tested using
recent tools from the moment inequalities literature. We show that our test can
easily accommodate covariates and aggregate shocks, and, importantly for practical
purpose, is robust to some degree of measurement errors on the elicited beliefs. We
apply our method to test for rational expectations about future earnings, using data
from the Survey of Consumer Expectations. While individuals tend to be right on
average about their future earnings, our test strongly rejects rational expectations.
In this context, as in any situation where rational expectations are violated, a nat-
ural next step is to quantity the magnitude of the deviations from rational expec-
tations that one can rationalize from the available data. We examine this issue in
D’Haultfœuille et al. (2018b).
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A Aggregate shocks
A.1 Statistical tests in the presence of aggregate shocks
In this appendix, we show how to adapt the construction of the test statistic and ob-
tain similar results as in Theorem 2 in the presence of aggregate shocks. As explained
in Section 2.2.3, we mostly have to replace Y˜ by Y˜c = Dq
(
Y˜ , c
)
+(1−D)ψ. Because
we include covariates here, as in Section 2.3, c is actually a function of X. Also, the
true function c0 has to be estimated. We let ĉ denote such a nonparametric estimator,
which is based on E[q(Y, c0(X))|X] = E[ψ|X]. When q(y, c) = y − c or q(y, c) = y/c,
we get respectively c0(X) = E(Y |X)− E(ψ|X) and c0(X) = E(Y |X)/E(ψ|X), and ĉ
is easy to compute using nonparametric estimators of E(Y |X) and E(ψ|X).
Because in Proposition 3 (ii) we do not test for a moment equality anymore, m
(
Di, Y˜i, Xi, g, y
)
reduces tom1
(
Di, Y˜c,i, Xi, g, y
)
. We let hereaftermn(g, y) =
∑n
i=1m1
(
Di, Y˜c,i, Xi, g, y
)
/n.
In the test statistic T , we replace, for (y, g) ∈ Y × ∪r≥1Gr, Σn(g, y) by Σn(g, y) =
Σ̂n(g, y) + Diag
(
V̂
(
Y˜cˆ
)
, V̂
(
Y˜cˆ
))
, where Σ̂n(g, y) and V̂
(
Y˜cˆ
)
are respectively the
sample covariance matrix of
√
nmn (g, y) and the empirical variance of Y˜cˆ. The last
difference with the test considered in Section 2.3 is that when using the bootstrap to
compute the critical value, we also have to re-estimate c0 in the bootstrap sample.
We obtain in this context a result similar to Theorem 2 above, under the regularity
conditions stated in Assumption 4. We let hereafter Cs
(
[0, 1]dX
)
denote the space
of continuously differentiable functions of order s on [0, 1]dX that have a finite norm
‖c‖s,∞ = max|k|≤s supx∈[0,1]dX
∣∣c(k)(x)∣∣. We also let, for any function f on a set G, ‖f‖G =
supx∈G |f(x)|. Finally, when the distribution of
(
D, Y˜ ,X
)
is F , KF denotes the
asymptotic covariance kernel of n−1/2Diag
(
V
(
Y˜c0
))−1/2
m.
Assumption 4 (i) ĉ and c0 belong to Cs
(
[0, 1]dX
)
, with s ≥ dX . Moreover, ‖ĉ −
c0‖[0,1]dX = oP (1).
(ii) For all y ∈ Y, q is Lipschitz on Y× [−C,C] for some C > ‖c0‖[0,1]dX . Moreover,
sup(y,c)∈Y×[−C,C] |q(y, c)| ≤M0;
(iii) For all c ∈ R, the function q(·, c) : Y → Y is bijective and its inverse qI(·, c) is
Lipschitz on Y;
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(iv) Fψ|X(·|x), FY |X(·|x) are Lipschitz on Y uniformly in x ∈ [0, 1]dX with constants
QF,1 satisfying supF∈F0 QF,1 ≤ Q1 <∞. Also, Fq(ψ,c(X)), Fq(Y,c(X)) are Lipschitz
on [−M0,M0] with constants QF,2 satisfying supF∈F0 QF,2 ≤ Q2 <∞;
(iv) infF∈F VF
[
Y˜ 2c
]
> 0 and 0 ≤ infF∈F EF [D] ≤ supF∈F EF [D] ≤ 1− 0 for some
ε0 ∈ (0, 1/2). Also, V̂F
[
Y˜ 2ĉ
]
is a consistent estimator of VF
[
Y˜ 2c
]
.
Part (i) imposes some regularity conditions on c0 and its nonparametric estimator ĉ.
It is possible to check such regularity conditions on ĉ with kernel or series estimators
of E(Y |X) and E(ψ|X). Parts (ii) and (iii) also hold when q(y, c) = y − c and
q(y, c) = q(y)/c, by imposing in the second case that c belongs to a compact subset of
(0,∞). Proposition 5 shows that under these conditions, the test has asymptotically
correct size.
Proposition 5 Suppose that rn →∞ and that Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Then (i)
in Proposition 2 holds, replacing ϕn,α by ϕn,α,ĉ.
Results like (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 2 could also be obtained under the conditions
of Proposition 5, modifying directly the proof of Proposition 2.
A.2 Impossibility results with more flexible effects of aggre-
gate shocks
We show here that restrictions in the way aggregate shocks affect the outcome are
needed to be able to reject RE with FY and Fψ. We consider for that purpose the
following model:
Y =
K∑
k=0
CkV
k + ε, (4)
where V is I-measurable and the individual shock ε satisfies E[ε|I] = 0. The vector
C := (C0, ..., CK)
′ represents aggregate shocks, which is assumed to be independent
of I, with support RK+1. We also assume that E(C) = (0, 1, 0, ..., 0)′, so that V =
E[Y |I] and under RE, ψ = V . Let Qc(y) =
∑K
k=0 cky
k. Then E(Y |C = c, I) = Qc(V )
and under RE, we have
E(Y |C = c, I) = Qc(ψ).
34
Hence, as in Section 2.2.3, we consider the following hypothesis:
H0SK : there exist random variables (Y
′, ψ′) , a sigma-algebra I ′ and c ∈ RK+1 such that
σ(ψ′) ⊂ I ′, Y ′ ∼ Y, ψ′ ∼ ψ and E [Y ′|I ′] = Qc(ψ′).
The following proposition is a negative result on the possibility to test for H0SK .
Proposition 6 Suppose that FY and Fψ are continuous with supports that are bounded
intervals. For any η > 0, there exists K > 0 and F , with supu∈R |F (u)− Fψ(u)| < η,
such that H0SK holds with Y and ψ˜ ∼ F (instead of ψ).
Proposition 6 states that as K grows large, the set of cdfs FY and Fψ satisfying
H0SK (and thus RE in Model (4)) becomes arbitrarily close, for the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov metric, to the set of of cdfs FY and Fψ that do not satisfy H0SK . In other
words, ∪K∈NH0SK is dense in the set of all continuous cdfs having bounded interval
as supports. When combined with Theorem 2 in Bertanha and Moreira (2020), this
implies that there does not exist any almost-surely continuous test of ∪K∈NH0SK that
has non-trivial power.
A similar, negative result holds if aggregate shocks are allowed to vary with respect to
unobserved, individual-specific variables. For instance, shocks may be sector-specific,
but sectors may be unobserved in the data. To show such an impossibility result,
consider the following model:
Y = q(C,U) + V + ε,
where both U and V are I−measurable, C is an aggregate shock independent of I and
the individual shock ε satisfies E[ε|I] = 0. Thus, aggregate shocks affect the outcome
in an additive way, but heterogeneously across individuals, depending on their U ,
which is assumed to be unobserved by the econometrician and can thus depend on
V in a flexible way. We assume without loss of generality that E[q(C,U)|I] = 0, so
that ψ = V under RE. Let us also assume that q(u, c) =
∑K
k=0 cku
k and U = ξV ,
with ξ > 0, ξ ⊥ V and E[ξk] < ∞ for all k ≤ K. Let C ′k = E[ξk]Ck if k 6= 1,
C ′1 = E[ξ]C1 − 1 and C ′ = (C ′0, ..., C ′K)′. Then, under RE,
E[Y |C ′ = c′, I] =
K∑
k=0
c′kψ
k.
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Moreover, if Supp(C) = RK+1, we also have Supp(C ′) = RK+1, and no constraint is
imposed on c′.13 As a result, we are led again to test H0SK , and the same negative
result as above holds.
B Tests based on linear regressions with measure-
ment errors
We suppose here to observe both (Ŷ , ψ̂) satisfying (1). In this framework, we study
the restrictions that RE entail on the coefficient β of the (theoretical) linear regression
of Ŷ on ψ̂.
Proposition 7 1. For any values of (V(Ŷ ),V(ψ̂),Cov(Ŷ , ψ̂)) such that V(Ŷ ) >
V(ψ̂), there exists a DGP compatible with this triple, satisfying (1), for which
RE hold and such that ε+ξY ⊥ ψ and Fξψ dominates at the second order FξY +ε.
2. If β < 1− 1/(1 + λ) for some λ ≥ 0, there exists no DGP compatible with this
value of β, satisfying (1), for which RE hold and such that corr(ξψ, ξY + ε) ≥ 0
and V(ψ)/V(ξψ) ≥ λ.
The first result is a negative one. It implies that without further restrictions than
those already imposed in Proposition 4, the regression of Ŷ on ψ̂ does not bring any
additional restriction related to RE. The second result, on the other hand, shows
that if one assumes a positive correlation between ξψ and ξY + ε and a lower bound
on the signal-to-noise ratio V(ψ)/V(ξψ), then β is bounded from below under RE.
The restriction corr(ξψ, ξY + ε) ≥ 0 seems reasonable. First, given that the shocks ε
cannot be anticipated, it is natural to assume that corr(ξψ, ε) = 0. It then follows
that the assumption corr(ξψ, ξY + ε) ≥ 0 holds if the measurement errors on Y and
ψ are positively correlated. This would typically happen, for instance, if individuals
report their expectations and realized earnings omitting in both cases some compo-
nents of their earnings, or if they instead overstate their realized earnings, and their
expectations accordingly.
13E[q(C,U)|I] = 0 implies that E[Ck] = 0 for k = 0, ...,K, but it does not restrict the set of
possible c′k.
36
This proposition just focuses on the linear regression of Ŷ on ψ̂, since this regression
has been very often used to test for RE. This means, however, that there may in
principle be additional restrictions on the joint distribution of (Ŷ , ψ̂) implied by RE.
C Tests with rounding practices
We have considered in Section 2.2.4 the possibility of measurement errors on ψ. An-
other source of uncertainty on ψ is rounding. Rounding practices by interviewees
are common. A way to interpret these practices is that in situations of ambiguity,
individuals may only be able to bound the distribution of their future outcome Y
(Manski, 2004). If individuals round at 5% levels, for instance, an answer ψ = 0.05
for the beliefs about percent increase of income should then only be interpreted as
ψ ∈ [0.025, 0.075]. Another case where only bounds on ψ are observed is when ques-
tions to elicit subjective expectations take the following form: “What do you think
is the percent chance that your own [Y ] will be below [y]?”, for a certain grid of
y. If 0 and 100 are always observed, or if we assume that the support of subjective
distributions is included in [y, y], we can still compute bounds on ψ.14 In such cases,
we only observe (ψL, ψU), with ψL ≤ ψ ≤ ψU . For a thorough discussion of this issue,
and especially of how to infer rounding practices, see Manski and Molinari (2010).
In this setting, rationalizing rational expectations is less stringent than in our baseline
set-up since the constraints on the distribution of ψ are weaker. Formally, the null
hypothesis takes the following form:
H0B : ∃(Y ′, ψ′, I ′) : σ(ψ′) ⊂ I ′, Y ′ ∼ Y, FψU ≤ Fψ′ ≤ FψL and E(Y ′|I ′) = ψ′.
To obtain an equivalent formulation to H0B, a natural idea would be to fix a candidate
cdf F ∈ [FψU , FψL ] for Fψ and apply Theorem 1 with this F . Then, letting ∆F (y) =∫ y
−∞ FY (t)−F (t)dt and δF = E(Y )−
∫
udF (u), H0B would hold as long as for some F ∈
[FψU , FψL ], ∆F (y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ R and δF = 0. In practice though, directly checking
whether such a distribution exists would be very difficult. Fortunately, we show in
the following proposition that it is in fact sufficient to check that these conditions
14Note however that in this case, our approach does not take into account all the information on
the subjective distribution.
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hold for a specific candidate distribution. To define the cdf of this distribution, we
introduce, for all b ∈ R, the random variables
ψb = ψU1l{ψU < b}+ max(b, ψL)1l{ψU ≥ b}.
We also let ψ−∞ = ψL and ψ∞ = ψU . The cdf of ψb is then F b(t) = FψU (t)1l{t <
b} + FψL(t)1l{t ≥ b}, for all b ∈ R. We let FB = {F b, b ∈ R} denote the set of all
such cdfs.
Assumption 5 E(|Y |) <∞, E(|ψL|) <∞ and E(|ψU |) <∞.
Proposition 8 Suppose that Assumption 5 holds. First, if E[ψL] ≤ E[Y ] ≤ E[ψU ],
there exists a unique F ∗ ∈ FB such that δF ∗ = 0. Second, the following statements
are equivalent:
(i) H0B holds.
(ii) E[ψL] ≤ E[Y ] ≤ E[ψU ] and ∆F ∗(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ R.
This test shares some similarities with the test in the presence of aggregate shocks.
Specifically, if E[ψL] ≤ E[Y ] ≤ E[ψU ], we first identify b0 ∈ R such that the candidate
belief ψb0 , which plays a similar role as the modified outcome q(Y, c0) in the test with
aggregate shocks, satisfies the equality constraint E[ψb0 ] = E[Y ]. Noting that the
inequality ∆F ∗(y) ≥ 0 can be rewritten as E
[
(y − Y )+ − (y − ψb0)+] ≥ 0, it follows
from (ii) that rationalizing RE in this context (i.e., H0B) is then equivalent to a set
of many moment inequality constraints involving the distributions of realizations Y
and candidate belief ψb0 .
D Tests with sample selection in the datasets
We consider here cases where the two samples are not representative of the same
population, or formally, D is not independent of (Y, ψ). This may arise for instance
because of oversampling of some subpopulations or differences in nonresponse between
the two surveys that are used. We assume instead that selection is conditionally
exogenous, that is to say:
D ⊥ (Y, ψ)|X. (5)
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We show how to use a propensity score weighting to handle such a selection. Denote
by p(x) = P (D = 1|X = x) = E [D|X = x] the propensity score and by
W (X) =
D
p(X)
− 1−D
1− p(X) .
The law of iterated expectations combined with Proposition 2 directly yields the
following proposition:
Proposition 9 Suppose that (5) and Assumption 1 hold. Then H0X is equivalent to
E
[
W (X)
(
y − Y˜
)+∣∣∣∣X] ≥ 0
for all y ∈ R and E
[
W (X)Y˜
∣∣∣X] = 0.
This proposition shows that under sample selection, we can build a statistical test of
H0X akin to that developed in Section 2.3, by merely estimating nonparametrically
p(X). We could consider for that purpose a series logit estimator, for instance.
Validity of such a test would follow using very similar arguments as for the test
with aggregate shocks considered above.
E Simulations with covariates
We consider here simulations including covariates. The DGP is similar to that con-
sidered in Section 3. Specifically, we assume that Y = ρψ +
√
Xε, with ρ ∈ [0, 1],
ψ ∼ N (0, 1), X ∼ Beta(0.1, 10) and
ε = ζ (−1l{U ≤ 0.1}+ 1l{U ≥ 0.9}) ,
where ζ ∼ N (2, 0.1) and U ∼ U [0, 1]. (ψ, ζ, U,X) are supposed to be mutually
independent. Like in the test without covariates, we can show that the test with
covariates is able to reject RE if and only if ρ < 0.616. On the other hand, E [Y |X] =
E [ψ|X], so the naive conditional test has no power. The test based on conditional
variances rejects only if ρ < 0.445. Finally, we can show that without using X, our
test has power only for ρ < 0.52. Hence, relying on covariates allows us to gain power
for ρ ∈ [0.521, 0.616).
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Again, we consider nψ = nY = n ∈ {400; 800; 1, 200; 1, 600; 3, 200}, use 500 bootstrap
simulations to compute the critical value, and rely on 800 Monte-Carlo replications
for each value of ρ and n. We use the same parameters p = 0.05 and b0 = 0.3 as
above.
Notes: the dotted vertical lines correspond to the theoretical limit for the rejection of the
null hypothesis for test based on variance (ρ ' 0.445), our test without covariates (ρ '
0.521) and our tests with covariates (ρ = 0.616). The dotted horizontal line corresponds
to the 5% level.
Figure 2: Power curves for the test with covariates.
Figure 2 shows that the RE test with covariates asymptotically outperforms the
RE test without covariates. The test exhibits a similar behavior as that without
covariates, though, as we could expect, the power converges less quickly to one as n
tends to infinity.
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F Additional material on the application
F.1 Effect of the Winsorization on the RE test
Table 4: Full test of RE with different levels of Winsorization
Winsorization level 0.95 0.97 0.99
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
All < 0.001 < 0.001 0.002
Women < 0.001 < 0.001 0.001
Men 0.210 0.254 0.342
White 0.021 0.030 0.049
Minorities 0.006 0.007 0.018
College degree 0.130 0.146 0.196
No college degree 0.013 0.012 0.009
High numeracy 0.012 0.017 0.034
Low numeracy 0.022 0.026 0.029
Tenure ≤ 6 months 0.001 0.005 0.009
Tenure > 6 months 0.091 0.118 0.304
Notes: We test H0S with q(y, c) = y/c, using 5,000 bootstrap simula-
tions to compute the critical values. Distributions of realized earnings
(Y ) and earnings beliefs (ψ) are both Winsorized at either the 0.95,
0.97, or 0.99 quantile.
F.2 Possibly endogenous attrition in the survey
In addition to measurement errors, another potential issue when using the linked
data (Y, ψ) is that attrition may be related to Y itself. This would create a sample
selection issue that would invalidate the direct test, even absent any measurement
errors. To explore this possibility, Table 5 below reports the estimation results from
a logit model of attrition on earnings beliefs, gender, race/ethnicity, college degree
attainment, numeracy test score, tenure and a (linear) time trend. The main takeaway
from this table is that earnings beliefs ψ are significantly associated with attrition,
even after controlling for this extensive set of characteristics. This result suggests
that individuals for whom we observe both earnings expectations and realizations are
likely to earn more than those who are not followed across the two waves. Along
the same lines, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects at the 1% level the equality of the
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distributions of realized earnings between the whole sample and the subsample that
would be used for the direct test. Similarly, we reject the equality of the distributions
of expected earnings between these two samples. These results indicate that, in
this context, the direct RE test is likely to be misleading. Conversely, attrition is
unlikely to be an issue with our test, since we use in each wave the observations of
all respondents.15
Table 5: Logit model of attrition
Intercept ψ Male White Coll. Degree Low Num. Tenure > 6 Trend
All 1.327∗∗ -6.206e-06∗∗ 0.046 -0.311 -0.137 -0.141 -0.786∗∗ -0.040
(0.293) (1.621e-06) (0.138) (0.222) (0.139) (0.162) (0.164) (0.033)
Notes: 1,565 observations. Significance levels: †: 10%, ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%.
G Proofs
G.1 Notation and preliminaries
For any set G, let us denote by l∞(G) the collection of all uniformly bounded real
functions on G equipped with the supremum norm ‖f‖G = supx∈G |f(x)|. Denote by
L2(F ) the square integrable space with respect to the measure associated with F ,
and let ‖·‖F,2 be the corresponding norm. We let N(, T , L2(F )) denote the minimal
number of -balls with respect to ‖·‖F,2 needed to cover T . An -bracket (with respect
to F ) is a pair of real functions (l, u) such that l ≤ u and ‖u− l‖F,2 ≤ . Then, for
any set of real functions M, we let N[](,M, L2(F )) denote the minimum number of
-brackets needed to cover M. We denote by G = (∪r≥1Gr). For x ∈ Rd, d > 1, we
denote by ‖x‖∞ = maxj=1,...,d |x|.
For a sequence of random variable (Un)n∈N and a set F0, we say that Un = OP (1)
uniformly in F ∈ F0 if for any  > 0 there exist M > 0 and n0 > 0 such that
15The one assumption we need to make is that respondents in the surveys used to measure ψ (i.e.,
those of March and July 2015) are drawn from the same population as those from the surveys used
to measure Y (i.e., those of July and November 2015). That there is no significant time trend in the
attrition model (Table 5) suggests that this assumption is reasonable in this context.
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supF∈F0 PF (|Un| > M) <  for all n > n0. Similarly we say that Un = oP (1)
uniformly in F ∈ F0 if for any  > 0, supF∈F0 PF (|Un| > )→ 0.
Finally, we add stars to random variables whenever we consider their bootstrap ver-
sions, as with T ∗ versus T . We define oP ∗ and OP ∗ as above, but conditional on(
Y˜i, Di, Xi
)
i=1...n
. Convergence in distribution conditional on
(
Y˜i, Di, Xi
)
i=1...n
is
denoted by →d∗ .
G.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Under H0, there exist Y
′, ψ′ and I ′ such that Y ′ ∼ Y , ψ′ ∼ ψ, σ(ψ′) ⊂ I ′ and
E(Y ′|I ′) = ψ′. Then, by the law of iterated expectations,
E[Y ′|ψ′] = E [E [Y ′|I ′]|ψ′] = E [ψ′|ψ′] = ψ′.
Conversely, if there exists (Y ′, ψ′) such that Y ′ ∼ Y , ψ′ ∼ ψ and E[Y ′|ψ′] = ψ′, let
I ′ = σ (ψ′). Then ψ′ = E [Y ′|ψ′] = E [Y ′|I ′] and H0 holds.
G.3 Proof of Theorem 1
(i) ⇔ (iii). By Strassen’s theorem (Strassen, 1965, Theorem 8), the existence of
(Y, ψ) with margins equal to FY and Fψ and such that E [Y |ψ] = ψ is equivalent to∫
fdFψ ≤
∫
fdFY for every convex function f . By, e.g., Proposition 2.3 in Gozlan
et al. (2018), this is, in turn, equivalent to (iii).
(ii) ⇔ (iii). By Fubini-Tonelli’s theorem, ∫ y−∞ FY (t)dt = E [∫ y−∞ 1l{t ≥ Y }dt] =
E [(y − Y )+] . The same holds for ψ. Hence, ∆(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ R is equivalent
to E
[
(y − Y )+] ≥ E [(y − ψ)+] for all y ∈ R. The result follows.
G.4 Proof of Proposition 1
First, by Jensen’s inequality, we obtain
E[(y0 − Y )+|ψ] ≥ (y0 − E(Y |ψ))+ = (y0 − ψ)+.
Moreover, ∆(y0) = 0 implies that E((y0−Y )+) = E((y0−ψ)+). Hence, almost surely,
we have
E[(y0 − Y )+|ψ] = (y0 − ψ)+.
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Equality in the Jensen’s inequality implies that the function is affine on the support
of the random variable. Therefore, for almost all u, we either have Supp(Y |ψ = u) ⊂
[y0,∞) or Supp(Y |ψ = u) ⊂ (−∞, y0]. Because E [Y |ψ] = ψ, Supp(Y |ψ = u) ⊂
[y0,∞) for almost all u > y0 and Supp(Y |ψ = u) ⊂ (−∞, y0] for almost all u < y0.
Then, for all τ ∈ (0, 1), F−1Y |ψ(τ |u) ≥ y0 for almost all u ≥ y0 and F−1Y |ψ(τ |u) ≤ y0 for
almost all u ≤ y0. Thus, for all τ ∈ (0, 1), by continuity of F−1Y |ψ(τ |·), F−1Y |ψ(τ |y0) = y0.
This implies that Y |ψ = y0 is degenerate.
G.5 Proof of Proposition 2
We first prove that H0X is equivalent to the existence of (Y
′, ψ′) such that DY ′ +
(1 − D)ψ′ = Y˜ , D ⊥ (Y ′, ψ′)|X and E((Y ′|ψ′, X) = ψ′. First, under H0X , there
exists (Y ′, ψ′, I ′) such that DY ′+ (1−D)ψ′ = Y˜ , D ⊥ (Y ′, ψ′)|X, σ(ψ′, X) ⊂ I ′ and
E(Y ′|I ′) = ψ′. Then
E[Y ′|ψ′, X] = E [E [Y ′|I ′]|ψ′, X] = E [ψ′|ψ′, X] = ψ′.
Conversely, if there exists (Y ′, ψ′) such that DY ′ + (1 −D)ψ′ = Y˜ , D ⊥ (Y ′, ψ′)|X
and E(Y ′|ψ′, X) = ψ′, let I ′ = σ (X ′, ψ′). Then ψ′ = E(Y ′|ψ′, X) = E(Y ′|I ′) and
H0X holds. The proposition then follows as Theorem 1.
G.6 Proof of Proposition 4
For all y, ξ 7→ E[(y−ψ−ξ)+] is decreasing and convex. Then, because Fξψ dominates
at the second order FξY +ε, we have∫
E
[
(y − ψ − ξ)+] dFε+ξY (ξ) ≥ ∫ E [(y − ψ − ξ)+] dFξψ(ξ).
As a result, for all y, we obtain
E
[(
y − Ŷ
)+]
=
∫
E
[
(y − ψ − ε− ξY )+ |ε+ ξY = ξ
]
dFε+ξY (ξ)
=
∫
E
[
(y − ψ − ξ)+] dFε+ξY (ξ)
≥
∫
E
[
(y − ψ − ξ)+] dFξψ(ξ)
=E
[
(y − ψ̂)+
]
.
Moreover, E
(
Ŷ
)
= E
(
ψ̂
)
. By Theorem 1, Ŷ and ψ̂ satisfy H0.
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G.7 Proof of Theorem 2
(i) This is a particular case of Proposition 5 below, with q(Y, c0) = Y . The proof is
therefore omitted.
(ii) We show that equality holds for F0 ∈ F0 satisfying the conditions stated in (ii).
The proof is divided in three steps. We first prove convergence in distribution of T to
S defined below, and conditional convergence of T ∗ towards the same limit. Then we
show that the cdf H of S is continuous and strictly increasing in the neighborhood
of its quantile of order 1− α, for any α ∈ (0, 1/2). The third step concludes.
1. Convergence in distribution of T and T ∗.
Let us introduce some notation. Let Kj,j (j ∈ {1, 2}) be the j-th diagonal element
of the covariance kernel K, S : (ν,K) 7→ (1 − p)
(
−ν1/K1/21,1
)+2
+ p
(
ν2/K
1/2
2,2
)2
,
q(r) = (r2 + 100)
−1
(2r)−dX , and
νn,F0(y, g) =
1√
n
n∑
i=1
Diag
(
VF0
(
Y˜
))−1/2 (
m
(
Di, Y˜i, Xi, g, y
)
− EF0
[
m
(
Di, Y˜i, Xi, g, y
)])
.
Finally, we define kn,F0(y, g) =
√
nDiag
(
VF0
(
Y˜
))−1/2
EF0
[
m
(
Di, Y˜i, Xi, g, y
)]
,
Kn,F0(y, g, y
′, g′) = Diag
(
VF0
(
Y˜
))−1/2
Ĉov
(√
nmn(y, g),
√
nmn(y
′, g′)
)
Diag
(
VF0
(
Y˜
))−1/2
,
Kn,F0(y, g, y
′, g′) = Kn,F0(y, g, y
′, g′) + Diag
(
VF0
(
Y˜
))−1/2
Diag
(
V̂
(
Y˜
))
Diag
(
VF0
(
Y˜
))−1/2
,
and use the notations Kn,F0(y, g) = Kn,F0(y, g, y, g) and Kn,F0(y, g) = Kn,F0(y, g, y, g).
We have, by definition of T ,
T = sup
y∈Y
∑
(a,r):r∈{1,...,rn},a∈Ar
q(r)S (νn,F0(y, ga,r) + kn,F0(y, ga,r), Kn,F0(y, ga,r)) .
To characterize the distribution of T (resp. T ∗), we first prove the convergence of
νn,F0 and Kn,F0(y, ga,r) (resp. ν
∗
n,F0
and K∗n,F0(y, ga,r)). For those purposes, we use a
class of functions which is a general form taken by m1 defined in (2), namely, for any
0 < N1 < M1,
M0 = {fy,φ1,φ2,g (y˜, x, d) =
(
dφ1 (y − y˜)+ − (1− d)φ2 (y − y˜)+
)
g(x),
(y, φ1, φ2, g) ∈ Y × [N1,M1]2 × G}.
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Remark thatM0 is a particular case of classesM defined in (9) below. Then, by the
proof of Proposition 5 below, Assumptions PS1 and PS2 in AS are satisfied. Thus,
the assumptions of Lemma D.2 in AS hold as well. This entails that Assumptions
PS4 and PS5 in AS hold. Namely, there exists a Gaussian process νF0 such that
- νn,F0 →d νF0 and ν∗n,F0 →d∗ νF0 ;
- For all r ∈ N and (y, g) ∈ Y×Gr, Kn,F0(y, g)→P KF0(y, g)+I2 andK∗n,F0(y, g)→P ∗
KF0(y, g) + I2, where I2 is the 2× 2 identity matrix.
Moreover, letting kF0(y, g) denote the limit in probability of kn,F0(y, g), we have
kF0(y, g) = 0 if (y, g) ∈ LF0 and ∞ otherwise. Note that by assumption, the set
LF0 is nonempty.
Thus, using (D.11) in the proof of Theorem D.3. in AS, which is based on the uniform
continuity of the function S in the sense of Assumption S2 therein, we have, under
F0,
T →d sup
y∈Y
∑
(a,r)∈Ar×N
S (νF0(y, ga,r) + kF0(y, ga,r), KF0(y, ga,r) + I2)
= S := sup
y∈Y
∑
(a,r):(y,ga,r)∈LF0
q(r)S (νF0(y, ga,r), KF0(y, ga,r) + I2) ,
where the equality follows by definition of S and kF0(y, g). Similarly, using As-
sumption PS5 and (D.11) in AS, replacing T by T ∗ and quantities νn,F0(y, ga,r) and
Kn,F0(y, ga,r) by their bootstrap counterparts (see the proof of Lemma D.4 in AS) we
have T ∗ →d∗ S.
2. The cdf H of S is continuous and strictly increasing in the neighborhood
of any of its quantile of order 1− α > 1/2.
First, the cdf H of S is a convex functional of the Gaussian process νF0 . Then, as
in the proof of Lemma B3 in Andrews and Shi (2013), we can use Theorem 11.1 of
Davydov et al. (1998) p.75 to show that H is continuous and strictly increasing at
46
every point of its support except r = inf{r ∈ R : H(r) > 0}. Moreover, for any r > 0,
H(r) ≥ P
sup
y∈Y
∑
(a,r):(y,ga,r)∈LF0
q(r)S (νF0(y, ga,r), KF0(y, ga,r) + I2) < r

≥ P
(
sup
j∈{1,2},(y,a,r):(y,ga,r)∈LF0
∣∣(K2,F0,j,j(y, ga,r) + )−1/2νF0,j(y, ga,r)∣∣ < √r/2Q
)
> 0,
where Q =
∑
(a,r):(y,ga,r)∈LF0 q(r) < ∞ and we use Problem 11.3 of Davydov et al.
(1998) p.79 for the last inequality. This yields r > r and H is continuous and strictly
increasing on (0,∞).
Then, we show that for any α ∈ (0, 1/2), the quantile of order 1 − α of the distri-
bution of S is positive. By assumption, there exists (y0, g0) ∈ LF0 such that either
KF0,11(y0, g0) > 0 or KF0,2(y0, g0) > 0. This yields
P (S > 0) = 1− P
sup
y∈Y
∑
(a,r):(y,ga,r)∈LF0
q(r)S (νF0(y, ga,r), KF0(y, ga,r) + I2) = 0

≥ 1− P (νF0,1(y0, g0) ≤ 0, νF0,2(y, g0) = 0)
≥ 1−min {P (νF0,1(y0, g0) ≤ 0) ,P (νF0,2(y0, g0) = 0)}
≥ 1/2. (6)
The first inequality holds by definition of the supremum and because S is nonnegative.
To obtain the last inequality, note that either νF0,1(y0, g0) is non-degenerate, in which
case the first probability is 1/2 (since νF0,1(y0, g0) is normal with zero mean), or
νF0,2(y0, g0) is non-degenerate, in which case the second probability is 0.
Finally, using that H is strictly increasing on (0,∞), (6) ensures that any quantile
of S of order 1− α with α ∈ [0, 1/2) is positive. Hence, H is continuous and strictly
increasing in the neighborhood of any such quantiles.
3. Conclusion.
Using T ∗ →d∗ S in distribution, Step 2 and Lemma 21.2 in Van der Vaart (2000),
we have that for η > 0, c∗n,α →d∗ c(1 − α + η) + η, where c(1 − α + η) is the
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(1−α+ η)-th quantile of the distribution of S. Because T →d S and H is continuous
at c(1− α + η) + η > 0, we obtain that
lim
η→0
lim sup
n→∞
PF0
(
T > c∗n,α
)
= α.
Combined with the inequality of Part (i) above, this yields the result.
(iii) This results follows from Theorem E.1 in AS. First, Assumption SIG2 in AS
holds for σ2F = VF
(
Y˜
)
, following the proof of Lemma 7.2 (b) under Assumption
3-(ii). Second, Assumptions PS4 and PS5 are satisfied using the point (ii) above.
Third, Assumptions CI, MQ, S1, S3, S4 in AS are also satisfied by construction of
the statistic T . Thus, Theorem E.1 in AS yields the result. 
G.8 Proof of Proposition 5
We introduce EF,c = EF
[
m
(
Di, Y˜c,i, Xi, g, y
)]
and
νn,F (y, g) =
1√
n
n∑
i=1
Diag
(
V̂F
(
Y˜ĉ
))−1/2 (
m
(
Di, Y˜ĉ,i, Xi, g, y
)
− EF,ĉ
)
,
νn,F (y, g) =
1√
n
n∑
i=1
Diag
(
VF
(
Y˜c0
))−1/2 (
m
(
Di, Y˜c0,i, Xi, g, y
)
− EF,c0
)
.
The proof is based on Theorem 5.1 in AS, hence we have to check that the corre-
sponding assumptions PS1, PS2, and SIG1 hold. Namely, we have to ensure that
- PS1: for all sequence F ∈ F and all (d, y′, x, g, y, c) ∈ {0, 1} × Y × [0, 1]dX ×
Gr × Y × Cs
(
[0, 1]dX
)∣∣∣∣∣∣m(d, y
′, x, g, y)
VF
(
Y˜c,i
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤M(d, y′, x, g, y) and EF
[
M
(
Di, Y˜c,i, Xi, g, y
)2+δ]
≤ C <∞,
where δ > 0 and for some function M ;
- PS2: for all sequence Fn ∈ F , the i.i.d triangular array of processes
T 0n =
{m(Di, Y˜n,c(Xn,i), Xn,i, g, y)
VFn
(
Y˜n,c(Xn,i)
) , (c, y, g) ∈ Cs ([0, 1]dX)× Y × G, i ≤ n, n ≥ 1}
is manageable with respect to some envelope function U1 (see Pollard, 1990,
p.38 for the definition of a manageable class);
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- SIG1: for all ζ > 0, supF∈F ,c∈Cs([0,1]dX ) P
(∣∣∣V̂F (Y˜i,c) /VF (Y˜i,c)− 1∣∣∣ > ζ) →
0.
We proceed in two steps, to handle the fact that c0 and Diag
(
VF
(
Y˜c0
))−1/2
are
estimated:
1. We first show that
sup
F∈F0
sup
g∈∪r≥1Gr,y∈Y
‖νn,F (y, g)− νn,F (y, g)‖∞ =oP (1), (7)
sup
F∈F0
sup
g∈∪r≥1Gr,y∈Y
∥∥ν∗n,F (y, g)− ν∗n,F (y, g)∥∥∞ =oP ∗(1). (8)
2. Next, we show that m satisfies assumptions PS1, PS2, and that SIG1 in AS also
holds for σ2F = VF
(
Y˜c0
)
, where F ∈ F and σ̂2n = n−1
∑n
i=1
(
Y˜ĉ,i − n−1
∑n
j=1 Y˜ĉ,j
)2
.
1. Proof of (7)-(8)
We apply the uniform version over F ∈ F0 of Theorem 3 in Chen et al. (2003) to a
general class of functions to which pertain the moment condition m (see (2), with Y˜
replaced here by Y˜c = Dq
(
Y˜ , c
)
+ (1−D)ψ and without the moment equality m2).
Hence, it suffices to verify that Assumptions (3.2) and (3.3) of Theorem 3 in Chen
et al. (2003) are satisfied. Let us introduce, for any 0 < N1 < M1, the classes of
functions
M1 =
{
fc,y,φ,g (y˜, x) = φ (y − q (y˜, c(x)))+ g(x), (c, y, φ, g) ∈ Cs
(
[0, 1]dX
)× Y × [N1,M1]× G} ,
(9)
M2 =
{
fc,y,φ,g (y˜, x) = φ (y − y˜)+ g(x), (c, y, φ, g) ∈ Cs
(
[0, 1]dX
)× Y × [N1,M1]× G} ,
M ={fc,y,φ1,φ2,g (y˜, x, d) = (dgc,y,φ1,g − (1− d)qc,y,φ2,g) (y˜, x) , g ∈M1, q ∈M2,
(c, y, φ1, φ2, g) ∈ Cs
(
[0, 1]dX
)× Y × [N1,M1]2 × G}.
Note that φ1, φ2, and c in the class M denote components of m that are estimated.
Consider the space Cs
(
[0, 1]dX
)× Y × [N1,M1]2 × G equipped with the norm
‖(c, y, φ1, φ2, g)‖ = max
{
‖c‖[0,1]dX , |y| , |φ1| , |φ2| , ‖g‖[0,1]dX
}
.
For v = (c, y, φ1, φ2, g), v
′ = (c′, y′, φ′1, φ
′
2, g
′) ∈ Cs
(
[0, 1]dX
) × Y × [N1,M1]2 × G and
(y˜, x, d) ∈ Y× [0, 1]dX×{0, 1}, we have, by the triangular inequality and Assumptions
49
4-(i) and 4-(v),
|fv (y˜, x, d)− fv′ (y˜, x, d)| ≤
∣∣gc,y,φ1,g (y˜, x)− gc′,y′,φ′1,g′ (y˜, x)∣∣
+
∣∣qc,y,φ2,g (y˜, x)− qc′,y′,φ′2,g′ (y˜, x)∣∣
≤(M +M0) (|φ1 − φ′2|+ |φ2 − φ′2|)
+ 2M1 [|y − y′|+ |q (y˜, c(x))− q (y˜, c′(x))|]
+ 2M0M1
[ |1l {q(y˜, c(x)) ≤ y} − 1l {q(y˜, c(x)) ≤ y′}|
+ |1l {q (y˜, c(x)) ≤ y′} − 1l {q (y˜, c′(x)) ≤ y′}|
+ |g(x)− g′(x)| ].
Denote by Kq > 0 the Lipschitz constant of q(y˜, .). Then, by convexity of x 7→ x2,
we obtain
1
7
|fv (y˜, x, d)− fv′ (y˜, x, d)|2 ≤(M +M0)2
(
|φ1 − φ′1|2 + |φ2 − φ′2|2
)
+ 4M21
[
|y − y′|2 +Kq ‖c− c′‖2[0,1]dX
]
+ 4(M0M1)
2
[ |1l {q(y˜, c(x)) ≤ y} − 1l {q(y˜, c(x)) ≤ y′}|
+ |1l {q (y˜, c(x)) ≤ y′} − 1l {q (y˜, c′(x)) ≤ y′}|
+ ‖g − g′‖2[0,1]dX
]
.
Fix δ > 0. If ‖v − v′‖ ≤ δ, this yields
1
7
|fv (y˜, x, d)− fv′ (y˜, x, d)|2 ≤δ2
(
2(M +M0)
2 + 4M21 (1 +Kq) + 4(M0M1)
2
)
+ 4(M0M1)
2
[
1l {q(y˜, c(x)) ≤ y + δ} − 1l {q(y˜, c(x)) ≤ y − δ}
+
∣∣1l{y˜ ≤ qI (y′, c(x))}− 1l{y˜ ≤ qI (y′, c′(x))}∣∣ ].
Next, by Assumption 4-(iv), we obtain
E
[
1l
{
q
(
Y˜ , c(X)
)
≤ y + δ
}
− 1l
{
q
(
Y˜ , c(X)
)
≤ y − δ
}]
= Fq(Y˜ ,c(X)) (y + δ)− Fq(Y˜ ,c(X)) (y − δ)
≤ 2Q2δ.
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Finally, we have
E
[∣∣1l{Y ≤ qI (y′, c(X))}− 1l{y˜ ≤ qI (y′, c′(X))}∣∣]
≤E [1l{Y ≤ qI (y′, c(X))−QF,2δ}− 1l{y˜ ≤ qI (y′, c(X)) +QF,2δ}]
≤E [FY |X (qI (y′, c(X))−QqIδ∣∣X)− FY |X (qI (y′, c(X)) +QqIδ∣∣X)]
≤2QF,1QqIδ,
where QqI is the Lipschitz constant of q
I . Thus, by Assumption 4, there exists Q > 0
such that
sup
F∈F0
E
[
sup
‖v−v′‖≤δ
∣∣∣fv (Y˜ , X,D)− fv′ (Y˜ , X,D)∣∣∣2] ≤ Qδ. (10)
Therefore the class M satisfies Condition (3.2) of Theorem 3 in Chen et al. (2003)
uniformly in F ∈ F0. Moreover, the class G is manageable and thus Donsker (see
Lemma 3 in Andrews and Shi, 2013). Finally, by Remark 3 (ii) in Chen et al. (2003),
Cs
(
[0, 1]dX
)
is also Donsker. Then, Cs
(
[0, 1]dX
)
, Y , [N1,M1], and G satisfy Condition
(3.3) of Theorem 3 in Chen et al. (2003). The result follows by Theorem 3 in Chen
et al. (2003).
2. m satisfies PS1 and PS2 of AS and SIG1 of AS also holds for σ2F and σ̂
2
n.
From Assumption 4 (iii) and the proof of Lemma 7.2 (a) in AS, PS1 is satisfied
replacing B by max(M,M0) in the proof of Lemma 7.2-(a) in AS.
We now show that PS2 in AS also holds. As the result is uniform over F0, we have to
consider sequences for the cdfs Fn of (Dn,i, Yn,i, Xn,i)i=1...n (with Fn ∈ F0). We also
define
Y˜n,c(Xn,i) = Dn,iq (Yn,i, c(Xn,i)) + (1−Dn,i)ψn,i,
Wn,i =
Dn,i
EFn [Dn,i]
− 1−Dn,i
EFn [1−Dn,i]
,
σ2Fn = VFn
(
Y˜n,c(Xn,i)
)
.
Note that by Assumption 3 (iii), σ2Fn ≥ σ > 0 for all Fn ∈ F . Let (Ω,F, Fn) be a
probability space and let ω denote a generic element in Ω. Showing Assumption PS2
in AS then boils down to prove that for any 0 < N1 < M1 := 1/ infF σ
2
F , the i.i.d
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triangular array of processes
T1,n,ω =
{
Wn,iφ
(
y − Y˜n,c(Xn,i)
)+
g(Xn,i), (c, y, φ, g) ∈ Cs
(
[0, 1]dX
)× Y × [N1,M1]× G,
i ≤ n, n ≥ 1
}
is manageable with respect to some envelope function U1. Lemma 3 in Andrews and
Shi (2013) shows that the processes {g(Xn,i), g ∈ G, i ≤ n, n ≥ 1} are manageable
with respect to the constant function 1. Then, using Lemma D.5 in AS, it remains
to show that
T ′1,n,ω =
{
Wn,iφ
(
y − Y˜n,c(Xn,i)
)+
, (c, y, φ) ∈ Cs
(
[0, 1]dX
)× Y × [N1,M1], i ≤ n, n ≥ 1} ,
is manageable with respect to some envelope. For such an envelope, we can consider
U ′1(ω) = (M0 +M)/(σ0). We now prove the manageability of T ′1,n,ω. Let us define
M′ ={fc,y,φ1,φ2 (y˜, x, d) = dφ1 (y − q (y˜, c(x)))+ − (1− d)φ2 (y − y˜)+ ,
(c, y, φ1, φ2) ∈ Cs
(
[0, 1]dX
)× Y × [N1,M1]2} .
Reasoning as for the classM defined in (9), and using the last equation of the proof
of Theorem 3 in Chen et al. (2003), p.1607, we have that for  > 0,
N[·] (,M′, ‖ · ‖2) ≤ N
(
′, [N1,M1]2, |·|
)×N (′,Y , |·|)×N (′, Cs ([0, 1]dX) , ‖ · ‖[0,1]dX ) ,
with ′ = (/(2Q))2 and Q defined in (10). Using Theorem 2.7.1 page 155 in Van der
Vaart and Wellner (1996), there exists a constant Q2 depending only on s, dX , and
[0, 1]dX such that
ln
(
N
(
′, Cs([0, 1]dX ), ‖ · ‖[0,1]dX
)) ≤ Q2′−dX/s.
Moreover, because Y and [N1,M1] are compact subsets of two Euclidean spaces, there
exist Q3, Q4 such that
N
(
′, [N1,M1]2, |·|
) ≤ Q3′−4 and N (′,Y , |·|) ≤ Q4′−2. (11)
This yields
ln
(
N[·] (,M′, ‖ · ‖2)
) ≤ (6 +Q2) max (− ln(′), ′−dX/s)+ ln(Q3Q4). (12)
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Let  denote element-by-element product and D ( |α U ′1(ω)| , α T ′1,n,ω) denote
random packing numbers. By (A.1) in Andrews (1994, p.2284), we have
sup
ω∈Ω,n≥1, α∈Rn+
D ( |α U ′1(ω)| , α T ′1,n,ω) ≤ sup
F∈F0
N
( 
2
,M′, ‖ · ‖2
)
≤ sup
F∈F0
N[·] (,M′, ‖ · ‖2) , (13)
where the second inequality follows as in e.g., Van der Vaart and Wellner (1996, p.84).
Then, (12) ensures (see Definition 7.9 in Pollard (1990), p.38) that
sup
ω∈Ω,n≥1, α∈Rn+
D ( |α U ′1(ω)| , α T ′1,n,ω) ≤ λ(),
where λ() = exp
(
(6 +Q2) max
(
−2 ln (/(2Q)) , (/(2Q))−2dX/s
)
+ ln(Q3Q4)
)
. More-
over, by using
√
a+ b ≤ √a+√b for all a, b ≥ 0,∫ 1
0
√
ln(λ())d ≤
√
6 +Q2
∫ 1
0
[
max
(
−2 ln (/(2Q)) , (/(2Q))−2dX/s
)]1/2
d+
√
ln(Q3Q4)
<∞.
Thus, T ′1,n,ω hence T1,n,ω are manageable. Therefore, m satisfies PS2 in AS.
Finally, in order to show that SIG1 in AS is satisfied, we use Assumption 4 (iii) and
follow the proof of Lemma 7.2 (b) in AS where we replace Y by q(Y, c(X)) and B by
max(M,M0). The result follows.
G.9 Proof of Proposition 6
Hereafter, we let [ψ, ψ] (resp. [y, y]) denote the support of ψ (resp. of Y ). As in
Lemma 1, H0SK holds if and only if there exists a pair of random variables (Y
′, ψ′)
and c such that Y ′ ∼ Y , ψ′ ∼ ψ and E [Y ′|ψ′] = Qc(ψ′). Now, if Qc is strictly
increasing on [ψ, ψ], we have E [Y ′|ψ′] = Qc(ψ′) if and only if E [Y ′|Qc(ψ′)] = Qc(ψ′).
In view of Theorem 1, the latter is equivalent to FY being a mean-preserving spread
of FQc(ψ′). Therefore, the proposition holds if for any η > 0, there exists K, c ∈ RK+1
and F such that (i) Qc is strictly increasing on [ψ, ψ]; (ii) supy∈R |Fψ(y)− F (y)| < η;
(iii) FY is mean-preserving spread of FQc(ψ˜), with ψ˜ ∼ F .
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Fix η > 0. Since FY is continuous on [y, y], it is uniformly continuous on this set.
Hence, there exists η′ such that
|y − y′| < η′ ⇒ |FY (y)− FY (y′)| < η. (14)
By assumption, F−1Y ◦ Fψ is increasing and continuous. Then, by Theorem 9 in Mu-
lansky and Neamtu (1998), there exists a sequence (Pn)n∈N of increasing polynomials
on [ψ, ψ] satisfying Pn(ψ) = y and Pn(ψ) = y and converging uniformly to F
−1
Y ◦ Fψ.
Hence, there exists Pn0 such that
sup
y∈[ψ,ψ]
|Pn0(y)− F−1Y ◦ Fψ(y)| < η′. (15)
Let K be the degree of Pn0 and c ∈ RK denote the vector of coefficients of Pn0 , so
that Qc = Pn0 . Qc is a non-constant polynomial, which is increasing on [ψ, ψ]. Hence,
its derivative vanishes a finite number of times and Qc is actually strictly increasing.
Hence, Condition (i) above holds. Moreover, combining (15) with (14), we obtain
sup
y∈[ψ,ψ]
|FY ◦Qc(y)− Fψ(y)| < η.
Now, let F := FY ◦Qc on [ψ, ψ], F (y) := 0 for all y < ψ and F (y) := 1 for all y > ψ.
Then F is continuous and increasing, with limit 0 and 1 respectively at −∞ and ∞.
Thus, it is a cdf and Condition (ii) above holds. Finally, let ψ˜ ∼ F . We have, for any
y ∈ [y, y],
P
(
Qc(ψ˜) ≤ y
)
= F ◦Q−1c (y) = FY (y).
This implies that FQc(ψ˜) is a mean-preserving spread of FY . The result follows.
G.10 Proof of Proposition 7
1. We consider for that purpose (ψ∗, ξ∗ψ, ξ
∗
Y , ε
∗) ∼ N (m,Σ), potentially different from
the true (ψ, ξψ, ξY , ε), and let
ψ̂∗ = ψ∗ + ξ∗ψ,
Ŷ ∗ = ψ∗ + ε∗ + ξ∗Y .
We then fix (m,Σ) so that the DGP satisfies all the restrictions specified in the propo-
sitions, and in particular, (V(Ŷ ∗),V(ψ̂∗),Cov(Ŷ ∗, ψ̂∗)) = (V(Ŷ ),V(ψ̂),Cov(Ŷ , ψ̂)).
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First, letting m = (m1,m2,m3,m4)
′, we impose m2 = m3 = m4 = 0, and set all the
non-diagonal terms of Σ, except Σ23 = Cov(ξ
∗
ψ, ξ
∗
Y ), equal to zero. Then (Ŷ
∗, ψ̂∗, ψ∗)
satisfy (1) and RE hold (considering I = σ(ψ∗) and Y ∗ = ψ∗ + ε∗). We fix be-
low Σ22 ∈ [0,V(ψ̂)]. Then let Σ11 = V(ψ̂) − Σ22 and Σ33 = V(Ŷ ) − V(ψ̂) + Σ22
and Σ44 = 0, so that (V(Ŷ ∗),V(ψ̂∗)) = (V(Ŷ ),V(ψ̂)). Also, because V(Ŷ ) > V(ψ̂),
V(ξ∗ψ) < V(ξ∗Y + ε∗) and Fξ∗ψ dominates at the second order Fξ∗Y +ε∗ .
Now, we fix Σ22. Let a = V(Ŷ ) − V(ψ̂) and c = Cov(Ŷ − ψ̂, ψ̂). Then, by Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality,
c2 ≤ V(ψ̂)V(Ŷ − ψ̂) = V(ψ̂)(a− 2c).
This means that there exists σ2 ∈ [0,V(ψ̂)] such that
c2 ≤ σ2(a− 2c). (16)
Let Σ22 = σ
2 and Σ23 = c+ Σ22. Then, by construction,
Cov(Ŷ ∗, ψ̂∗) = Σ11 + Σ23
= V(ψ̂)− Σ22 + Σ22 + c
= Cov(Ŷ , ψ̂).
Moreover, in view of (16) and by definition of Σ22 and Σ33,
Σ223 = c
2 + 2cΣ22 + Σ
2
22
≤ (a− 2c)Σ22 + 2cΣ22 + Σ222
= Σ33Σ22.
In other words, Σ is a proper covariance matrix.
2. Let λ = V(ψ)/σ2ξψ . If (1) and RE hold, Cov(ξψ, ε+ ξY ) ≥ 0 and λ ≥ λ, we obtain
β − 1 =Cov(Ŷ − ψ̂, ψ̂)
V(ψ̂)
=
Cov(ε+ ξY − ξψ, ξψ)
σ2ξψ(1 + λ)
≥− 1
1 + λ
.
The result follows.
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G.11 Proof of Proposition 8
We first prove that if E[ψL] ≤ E[Y ] ≤ E[ψU ], there exists a unique F ∗ ∈ FB such
that δF ∗ = 0. First, suppose that F
b 6= F b′ and, without loss of generality, b > b′.
Then ψb ≤ ψb′ , implying that F b(y) ≤ F b′(y) for all y. Moreover, the inequality is
strict for at least one y. As a result, E(ψb) > E(ψb′). In other words, there is at
most one F ∗ ∈ FB such that δF ∗ = 0. If E[ψL] = E[Y ] or E[ψU ] = E[Y ], such a
solution also exists by taking b = −∞ and b = ∞, respectively. Now, suppose that
E[ψL] < E[Y ] < E[ψU ]. For all ∞ > b > b′ > −∞,
ψb − ψb′ = (ψU −max(ψL, b′)) 1l{ψU ∈ [b′, b)}+ (b− b′)1l{ψL < b′, ψU ≥ b}
+ (b− ψL)1l{ψL ∈ [b′, b), ψU ≥ b}.
As a result, |ψb − ψb′| ≤ |b − b′|. This implies that δ˜ : b 7→ E[ψb] is continuous.
Moreover, limb→−∞ δ˜(b) = E[ψL] < E(Y ) and limb→∞ δ˜(b) = E[ψU ] > E(Y ). By the
intermediate value theorem, there exists b∗ such that δ˜(b∗) = E(Y ). Hence, there
exists F ∗ ∈ FB such that δF ∗ = 0. The first part of Proposition 8 follows.
Let us turn to the second part of the proposition. First, if (ii) holds, there exists
b0 ∈ R such that F ∗ = F b0 . Then, by construction and Theorem 1, Y and ψb0 satisfy
H0. Moreover, F
b0 ∈ [FψU , FψL ]. Therefore, H0B holds as well.
Now, let us prove that (i) implies (ii). Let us denote by D the set of all the cdfs for
ψ such that H0B holds. By Theorem 1, these are cdfs F satisfying FψU ≤ F ≤ FψL ,
δF = 0 and dominating at the second order FY . We show below that all F ∈ D
are dominated at the second order by F ∗. Then, because FψU ≤ F ∗ ≤ FψL and∫
ydF ∗(y) =
∫
ydFY (y), D is not empty only if F ∗ dominates at the second order FY .
The result then follows by Theorem 1.
Thus, we have to show that for all t ∈ R,
F ∗ = argminFψ∈D
∫ t
−∞
Fψ(y)dy. (17)
First, if F ∗ = F−∞, we have for all F 6= F ∗, F (y) ≤ FψL(y) = F ∗(y) for all y, with
strict inequality for some y. Then δF > δF ∗ = 0 and D = {F ∗}, implying that (17)
holds. Similarly, (17) holds if F ∗ = F∞.
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Suppose now that F ∗ = F b0 for some b0 ∈ R. Because FψU (y) ≤ Fψ(y) for all y < b0
and all Fψ ∈ D, (17) holds for all t < b0. We now prove that (17) holds also for
t ≥ b0. First suppose that t ≥ max(b0, 0). For all Fψ ∈ D,
∫
ydFY (y) =
∫
ydFψ(y)dy.
As a result, by Fubini’s theorem,
−
∫ 0
−∞
F ∗(y)dy +
∫ t
0
(1− F ∗(y)) dy +
∫ ∞
t
(1− F ∗(y)) dy
= −
∫ 0
−∞
Fψ(y)dy +
∫ t
0
(1− Fψ(y)) dy +
∫ ∞
t
(1− Fψ(y)) dy.
Because Fψ ≤ FψL = F ∗ on [b0,∞], this implies that
−
∫ 0
−∞
F ∗(y)dy +
∫ t
0
(1− F ∗(y)) dy ≥ −
∫ 0
−∞
Fψ(y)dy +
∫ t
0
(1− Fψ(y)) dy
and thus (17) holds for t ≥ max(b0, 0). Now, if b0 < 0 and t ∈ (b0, 0), we have
−
(∫ t
−∞
F ∗(y)dy +
∫ 0
t
F ∗(y)dy
)
+
∫ ∞
0
(1− F ∗(y)) dy
= −
(∫ t
−∞
Fψ(y)dy +
∫ 0
t
Fψ(y)dy
)
+
∫ ∞
0
(1− Fψ(y)) dy.
Using again Fψ ≤ FψL = F ∗ on [t,∞) yields
−
∫ 0
t
F ∗(y)dy +
∫ ∞
0
(1− F ∗(y)) dy ≤ −
∫ 0
t
Fψ(y)dy +
∫ ∞
0
(1− Fψ(y)) dy.
Therefore, the result also follows in this case.
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